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of the table you happen to sit.'
Introduction
Under what circumstances may a law partnership expel a partner? How
should the expulsion be accomplished? These are questions of moment in
many contemporary law firms.
A helpful discussion, it seems to me, breaks into two parts. First, what
are the substantive circumstances under which the expulsion of a partner can
be done both effectively and rightfully? Can the expulsion be simply a
function of a vote of the requisite number of partners, without any grounds,
or is cause required? Must the expulsion advance an interest of the firm?
Against what substantive standards, if any, is the expulsion measured, and
how are any applicable standards translated into norms specifically applicable
to law partner expulsions?
Second, what are the processes by which the expulsion is carried out?
Is the targeted partner entitled to notice of the impending expulsion? Is noti-
fication of cause required? Is a pre-expulsion hearing on the merits required?
Is the expelled partner entitled to a post-expulsion review on the merits by
either the partnership or a court?
1. GEORGEH. CAIN, LAWPARTNERSHIP: ITsRIGHTSANDRESPONSIBILITImS 166 (1996).
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Within both the substantive and the procedural parts of the discussion,
it is important to identify the baseline statutory and common law provisions
and then explore the range of permitted partnership-agreement modifications.
The discussion should also address what presumptions are entertained when
the partnership agreement is silent and when the burden of proof lies in estab-
lishing the various points of agreement.
The two areas of inquiry - substance and process - are united by the
common thread of good faith and fairness.2 By following this thread I propose
both to analyze the present state of the law of law partner expulsions and to
suggest a basic reform of that regime.
Partners must deal with one another fairly and in good faith. This is not,
on its face, a remarkable statement. But how we derive that charge to good
faith and fairness, how we define and characterize it, and how we apply it in
the context of the expulsion of a partner can introduce confounding subtleties
into the analysis.
The discussion is advanced by realizing that we are dealing with two
concepts of good faith and fairness, not simply one.3 They differ in deriva-
2. In this discussion I use the term "good faith and fairness" instead of"good faith and
fair dealing." The good faith and fairness formulation is found in relevant case law. See, e.g.,
Laux v. Freed, 348 P.2d 873, 878 (Cal. 1960) (discussing "complete good faith and fairness");
Thomas v. Schmelzer, 796 P.2d 1026, 1032 (Idaho App. 1990) (discussing "loyalty, integrity
and the utmost good faith and fairness" (quoting Stephens v. Stephens, 183 S.W.2d 822, 824
(Ky. 1944))); Curtis v. Campbell, 336 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Ky. 1960) ("[P]artners are obligated
to deal with each other in utmost good faith and fairness."); Stephens v. Stephens, 183 S.W.2d
822, 824 (Ky. 1944) (discussing "loyalty, integrity and the utmost good faith and fairness");
Sutton v. Fleming, 602 So.2d 228,230 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (commenting on "the obligation of
good faith and fairness" (cjuoting LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2809 Revision Cmt. (b) (West
1994))); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *2 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998)
("We have long recognized as a matter of common law that '[t]he relationship between...
partners... is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the participants the obligation of...
the utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings with each other with respect to
matters pertaining to the enterprise."' (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex.
1951))). The "good faith and fairness" formulation is also found in various commentaries. See,
e.g., ALANR. BROMBERG& LARRY E. RIBsTEIN, 2 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEN ON PARTNERSHIP,
§ 6.07(a)(1), at 6:108 (1998) ("The main elements of the partners' fiduciary duties have been
summarized as utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty."); JuDSON A. CRANE & ALAN R.
BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 68, at 389-90 (1968) ("The main
elements [of the fiduciary duties of partners] are well recognized: utmost good faith, fairness,
loyalty."); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 188, at 278-79 (2d ed. 1990) ("The fiduciary duty of a partner... in general...
is a duty to act toward his partners in good faith and fairness."). To the extent "fair dealing" is
interpreted to indicate a focus on procedure to the exclusion of substance, "fairness" presents
a more accurate indication of the richness of the concept.
3. Commentator Bill Callison has parsed the concept differently. See J. William
Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership
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tion, in description, and possibly in the power of their charges.4 One concept
of good faith and fairness sounds in tort, the other in contract.5 One is pre-
sented as a fiduciary duty, the other as a rule of construction.
The first charge to good faith and fairness arises from the fiduciary
nature of the partnership relation. It is, in some formulations, the essence of
the fiduciary relationship of partners. Fiduciary good faith and fairness is
status-driven. It is tort based. Simply put, partners are charged with good
faith and fairness inter se because that is what it means to be a partner.6 Thus,
one commentary finds that the "main elements [of the fiduciary relations of
partners] are well recognized: utmost good faith, fairness, loyalty,"7 while
another outlines the progression as follows: "One of the most significant
aspects of the partnership relation is its fiduciary character. A fiduciary duty
is a duty of loyalty.... The fiduciary duty of a partner has many specific
aspects, but in general it is a duty to act toward his partners in good faith and
Act, UniformLimitedLiabilityCompanyAct, andBeyond, I J. SMALL&EMERGINGBuS.L. 109,
141-48 (1997).
4. The concepts also differ in their temporal application. Under the UPA and common
law regime partners are charged with good faith and fair dealing during the pre-formation period
of their relationship. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 2, § 188, at 279 ("A partner's
fiduciary duty extends to conduct prior to the formation of the partnership ..... (citing Starr
v. International Realty, Ltd., 533 P.2d 165, 165-71 (Or. 1975))). But the contract-derived
charge does not extend to the pre-formation period. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981) ("This Section... does not deal with good faith in the formation
of a contract."). Thus, the contract-derived charge cannot be exclusive; the status-derived
charge is also present under the UPA and common law regime.
5. The distinction is not as clear as it is sometimes made to appear. A contractual
analysis that relies on contractual provisions implied at law from the relationship of the parties
as partners may be difficult to distinguish from a tort analysis which relies on duties arising
from the partner status of the parties.
6. 1 acknowledge that there is a popular strain of commentary that sees these matters
quite differently. Professor Larry Ribstein views fiduciary duties in the partnership context as
"essentially part of the standard form contract." See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2,
§ 6.07 at 6:108-6:109.
Fiduciary duties are essentially part of the standard form contract that governs
partnerships in the absence of contrary agreement. Because the parties cannot
anticipate all problems that may arise during the course of their relationship, and
because dealing with all of these problems contractually would be quite costly, the
law supplies general terms to fill in the interstices in the parties' contract. The
question, therefore, is determining what the partners would have been likely to
agree to in the absence of transaction costs, in light of practical considerations and
the other elements of the partnership relationship.
Id. (citation omitted). I find the criticisms of this strain of commentary quite convincing. See
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.
J. 879, 885-92.
7. CRANE&BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 68, at389-90.
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fairness."8 It is because of the fiduciary status of a partner that we are told
"the main elements of the obligations owed by one partner to another have
been defined as 'utmost good faith, fairness, loyalty,"' 9 and that "the partner-
ship relationship is a fiduciary relationship, requiring each partner ... to
exercise the highest degree of honesty and good faith in dealings with each
other.""° The charge derives from the status: "The status of partnership
requires of each member an obligation of good faith and fairness in their
dealings with one another."'"
The second charge to good faith and fairness arises from the contractual
aspect of the partnership relation. A partnership agreement is, in some of its
aspects under any analysis, a contract.12 As a contract, it "imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment." 3 Contractual good faith and fair dealing has no fixed content, but
"[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithful-
ness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with thejustified expecta-
tions of the other party."'4
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and common law regime, the
dual charges to fiduciary and contractual good faith and fairness apply to all
aspects of the partners' dealings inter se. They apply to partners in a law firm
as well as to partners in an auto repair shop. They apply to what is perhaps
the most drastic law partnership decision: the election to expel a partner.
The following discussion first presents and synthesizes the universe of
case law involving the expulsion of partners from law partnerships. The
discussion next critiques the present regime on both the substance and process
dimensions and proposes an alternative set of rules that, I believe, is more in
line with the underlying fiduciary and contractual charges to good faith and
8. REUSCHLErN & GREGORY, supra note 2, at 278-79.
9. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1078 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing CRANE
& BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 68, at 390).
10. Borys v. Rudd, 566 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
11. Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
12. The trend of the recent past seems to be in favor of a more contractual and less status-
oriented treatment ofthe partnership relation. I dissent from this trend. One of the early treatises
stated the distinction well: "A partnership is often called a contract, but this is inaccurate. It is
the relation or status resulting from a contract, just as marriage is a status, and not a contract."
WALTERA. SHUMAKERATREATISEONTHELAWOFPARTNERSHIP § 1, at3 (1905). The marriage
analogy has been used by modem commentators, as well. See Robert W. Hillman, Misconduct
as a Basisfor Excluding or Expelling a Partner: Effecting Commercial Divorce and Securing
Custody of the Business, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 527, 527-28 (1983). At the risk of being lumped in
with the covenant marriage crowd, this seems to me to be a helpful analogy.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 (1981).
14. See id § 205 cmt a.
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fairness. Finally, the discussion compares the proposed reforms with the
partnership law revisions included on these points in the generally applicable
provisions of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).
1. Law Partnership Expulsions: The Present State of the Law
The universe of reported cases involving law partner expulsions is both
small and of fairly recent origin. It is helpful to summarize briefly the rele-
vant cases.
A. Holman v. Coie
Holman v. Coie"5 involves the expulsion of two brothers, Francis and
William Holman, from their law partnership. 6 The partnership agreement in
this case provided for the expulsion of partners by a majority vote of the
executive committee, but did not specify whether such expulsion had to be for
cause and did not provide for any procedures to be followed. 7
A substantial firm client, the Boeing Company, had disputes with Francis
Holman that arose from Holman's activities as a Washington state senator and
informed the firm that it did not want him doing its work. 8 Less than a month
later, the executive committee, minus members Francis and William, met
in a nine and one-half hour "informal" session to discuss the fate of the
Holmans. 9 A consensus favored expulsion, although no formal vote was
taken at that time. ° Immediately upon Francis Holman's arrival back in
15. 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
16. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Callison, supra note
3, at 134-35.
17. See Holman, 522 P.2d at 519. The partnership agreement provided in Section 1.2 that
"any member may be expelled from the Firm by a majority voted of the Executive Committee."
Id. The court found that the "agreement does not require giving of notice, a statement of
reasons, a showing of good cause, or a hearing." Id. The portions of the partnership agreement
quoted in this section of the opinion focus on the mechanics of recording and implementing the
expulsion, not the questions of cause and due process: "When any member.., is expelled from
the Firm, that fact shall be endorsed on the master copy of this agreement.., and the person
involved shall no longer be a member of the Firm and his rights and obligations shall be as
hereinafter stated.... [The Day of Expulsion] for purposes of the calculations, computations
and determinations to be made hereunder, shall mean the close of business on the day immedi-
ately preceding the effective date of the ... expulsion .... Id. at 519-20 (quoting §§ 1.3, 6.1
of partnership agreement).
18. Id. at 517-18. Boeing also had complaints about Francis Holman's billing practices.
Id. at 518. William Holman apparently had not worked on Boeing matters for some time prior
to his expulsion. Id. at 517-18.
19. Id. at 518-19.
20. Id. at 519.
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Seattle following the end of the legislative session less than a week later, the
executive committee summoned Francis and William to a formal meeting at
which a resolution of expulsion was passed by a vote of seven to two.2 ' The
brothers' requests for the reasons behind the expulsion were denied.'
In the subsequent litigation, the brothers made procedural claims that
their partners breached the partnership agreement by failing to give notice of
the meeting, expelling the plaintiffs without stating reasons for the expulsion,
and failing to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard.' Francis and
William also made the substantive arguments that the expulsions were not for
cause and were not bona fide and in good faith.24 The trial court rejected both
the procedural and substantive claims, and the intermediate appellate court
upheld the determinations.'
Although it appears that the plaintiffs made the argument that certain
procedural protections were required by their status, the Holman court ap-
peared to take a narrow contractual approach to the procedure question. The
plaintiffs raised three procedural objections to the expulsions: failure to give
notice of the "informal" and formal meetings, failure to state reasons for the
expulsions, and failure to let the plaintiffs be heard.26 The court dealt with the




23. See id. The court identifies as elements of plaintiffs' breach of contract claims the
procedural claims of failure to give notice, failure to state reasons for the expulsion, and failure
to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard. Id. The court also identifies a fourth element,
defendants "expelling plaintiffs without cause." Id I treat that as a substantive claim rather
than a procedural claim - the court's analysis is limited to noting that the agreement does not
require cause for expulsions. See id.
24. See id. at 519, 523.
25. See id at 519-24.
26. Seeid. at519.
27. Id. Although the court did find a minor violation of the partnership agreement notice
provisions, it did not find "a sufficient violation of the partnership agreement to justify holding
there was an unlawful expulsion of the plaintiffs." Id. at 520-21. The court found that the nine
and one-half hour meeting of the executive committee was not a formal meeting of the execu-
tive committee and did not raise the contractual notice requirement. Id. at 520. The meeting
at which the plaintiffs were expelled was a formal meeting of the executive committee. Id. at
520-21. The court determined that although the plaintiffs, as members of the executive com-
mittee, were not entitled to advance notice of the meeting, they were entitled to receive an
agenda for the meeting. Id. at 521. However, because both plaintiffs had believed that their
termination would be the subject of the executive committee meeting, the court did not find that
the failure to provide an agenda was a sufficient violation to hold that the expulsions were
unlawful. Id
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The court noted plaintiffs' claim "that defendants' actions [at the formal
meeting during which the executive committee voted to expel the plain-
tiffs] violated the requirements of due process of law in that they failed to
give plaintiffs notice of expulsion, state reasons therefor, and provide
plaintiffs with an opportunity to be heard.""8 The plaintiffs apparently
claimed a dual origin of the process protections, being both contractual and
as a matter of law: "[Plaintiffs] contend there was substantial evidence that
such requirements [of notice of expulsion, specification of reasons, and an
opportunity to be heard] were within the intention of the signatory parties to
the partnership agreement and can be implied, either from the circumstances,
or as a matter of law."z9 The court treated the due process question as a matter
of contract:
In this case the express language of the partnership agreement itself must
be controlling; that language clearly does not contain any of the require-
ments plaintiffs now seek to assert as impliedly applicable. Where terms
of a contract, taken as a whole, are plain and unambiguous, the meaning is
to be deduced from the contract alone.... We find this partnership agree-
ment to [be] unambiguous, and not to require notice, reasons, or an oppor-
tunity to be heard. To inject those issues would be to rewrite the agreement
of the parties, a function we neither presume nor assume.3°
As part of the discussion of the good faith requirement, the Holman court
noted an English article in which the author argued that "the rules of natural
justice" require the procedural protections of notice, specification of reasons,
and a hearing prior to expulsion.3 The court rejected this analysis and en-
dorsed the partners' ability to adopt a "guillotine approach" to partner expul-
sions, if they desired:
These parties in writing the partnership clauses dealing with expulsion, and
the defendants who carried them out, chose to adopt the guillotine ap-
proach, rather than a more diplomatic approach, to the expulsion of part-
ners. The actions of defendants were within the contemplation of the
agreement. While this course of action may shock the sensibilities of
some, to others it may be that once the initial decision is made, the trau-
matic reaction to that decision is more quickly overcome and the end result
more merciful. However that course of action may appear to the reader,
the possibility of exactly such action occurring is clear from reading the
agreement. None of the partners had any reason to believe the agreement
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 521-23.
31. See id. at 524 (citing Bernard J. Davies, Good Faith Principle and the Expulsion
Clause in Partnership Law, 33 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 32, 32-42 (1969)).
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required anything more prior to abruptly and brusquely terminating their
services.32
Turning to the substantive claims, the court determined that there was no
cause requirement because the partnership agreement provision on expulsions
did not include one.3 On the obligation of good faith, the court began by
looking to the Washington enactment of UPA Section 3 1: "Dissolution is
caused: (1) ... (d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona
fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between the
partners .... 1,34 "'Bona fide,"' the court noted, "is defined as: 'In or with
good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud."'35
The Holman court acknowledged the general rule: "Undoubtedly, the
general rule of law is that the partners in their dealings with each other must
exercise good faith."36 But the Holman court adopted a construction of "good
faith" and "bona fide" that is limited to the financial aspects of the partnership
relationship: "However, the personal relationships between partners to which
the terms 'bona fide' and 'good faith' relate are those which have a bearing
upon the business aspects or prop erty of the partnership and prohibit a partner,
to-wit, a fiduciary, from taking any personal advantage touching those sub-
jects."" Using this tightly circumscribed conception of the duty of good faith
as limited to merely the financial aspects of the partnership relationship, the
Holman court rejected the expelled partners' good faith claims:
Plaintiffs' claims do not relate to the business aspects or property rights of
this partnership. There is no evidence the purpose of the severance was to
gain any business or property advantage to the remaining partners. Conse-
quently, in that context, there has been no showing of breach of the duty
of good faith toward plaintiffs.38
Holman is widely cited and relied upon, perhaps in excess of the reliance
that is normally given a decision of a typical state intermediate appellate
court. Regarding procedural issues, the case is cited as approving the "guillo-
tine" approach to law partner expulsions39 and as minimizing the importance
32. Id.
33. See id. at 519. The courtnoted that"[t]he partnership agreement, § 1.2, states in part:
'any member may be expelled from the Firm by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.'
The agreement does not require.., a showing of good cause ...." Id.
34. Id. at 523 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 25.04.310 (1994)).




39. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHics
OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRm BREAKUPs, 5:3-5:4 (1997).
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of procedural protections.4" Regarding substantive issues, Holman has been
influential in establishing the proposition that good faith and fair dealing, in
the context of law partnership expulsions, is limited to the lack of an economi-
cally predatory purpose.4
B. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray
In Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray,42 the expelled partner, Lawlis, was an
alcoholic. 3 He disclosed his alcoholism to the firm's finance committee in
July 1983. The committee, in response, specified conditions for Lawlis's
continued participation in the firm.' According to the court, "Lawlis was told
he would be returned to full partnership status if he complied with the condi-
tions imposed."45 Lawlis apparently gave up alcohol and was ultimately
successful in meeting the conditions specified by the firm.46
The firm's partnership agreement provided that the senior partners could
set partner compensation and expel partners.47 Exercising their power, the
40. See HILLMAN, supra note 39, at 5:20. The case is cited as evidence that "[a]lthough
English courts have traditionally shown some sensitivity to the importance of procedural
protections in expulsions, United States decisions have minimized the importance of the process
underlying expulsions." Id.
41. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). The characterization
of an economically improper purpose as "predatory" is not found in Holman. The range of
economically improper motives in Holman is cast in terms of a rule that "a partner is not
permitted to derive any profit or advantage from the partnership relationship except with the full
knowledge and consent of the partners," and in terms of a "severance," the purpose of which
"was to gain any business or property advantage to the remaining partners." Id. The character-
ization of economically improper motives as predatory is first found in Lmvlis v. Kightlinger
& Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
42. 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
43. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435,437 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The court
reports that Lawlis's alcohol problem caused him not to practice law for several months in early
1983 and in mid-1984. Id.
44. Id. at 438. The Finance Committee first met with a physician and established a
"Program Outline" for Lawlis's continued participation. Id. at 437. One of the conditions of
the program was that Lawlis cease the use of alcohol, and it was specified that he would not
receive a second chance. Id. at 437-38. Lawlis did resume the use of alcohol, and the firm still
gave him a second chance. Id. at 438. Following his second treatment in March of 1984,
Lawlis reportedly was successful in abstaining from the use of alcohol. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. The opinion is initially ambiguous about the vote required. At one point it
states that: "Under the 1984 agreement, the senior partners by majority vote were to determine
(a) the units each partner annually received, (b) the involuntary expulsion of partners, and
(c) the involuntary retirement of partners." Id. Later, the opinion states: "Article X of the 1984
agreement requires a minimum two-thirds vote of the senior partners to accomplish the involun-
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senior partners decreased Lawlis's compensation during the period of his
alcohol abuse and recovery. In October 1986, having not consumed alcohol
for two and one-half years, Lawlis met with the finance committee to ask for
a "substantial restoration of [his] previous status."4
The finance committee responded to Lawlis's request for a restoration of
his economic participation rights in the firm by recommending to the full
senior partnership that he be expelled.49 At the senior partnership meeting the
partners voted, with only Lawlis in dissent, to implement the expulsion."
Lawlis claimed in part that his expulsion violated the partners' implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing because the partners had the economically
predatory purpose of increasing the firm's lawyer-to-partner ratio.5 Advanc-
ing an analogy between the partnership relation and employment at will, the
firm claimed that it owed Lawlis no obligation of good faith and fair dealing.52
The court based its rejection of the at-will analogy on the Indiana enactment
of UPA Section 3 l(1)(d), which the court read as providing that "when a
partner is involuntarily expelled from a business, his expulsion must have
been 'bona fide' or in 'good faith' for a dissolution to occur without violation
of the partnership agreement."53 From this, the Lawlis court concluded: "[I]f
the power to involuntarily expel partners granted by a partnership agreement
is exercised in bad faith or for a 'predatory purpose,' as Lawlis phrases it, the
partnership agreement is violated, giving rise to an action for damages the
affected partner has suffered as a result of his expulsion."54 Lawlis asserted
that the partners demonstrated a predatory purpose in an internal memoran-
dum advocating the increase of the "lawyer to partner ratio" in the firm as a
means of increasing partner compensation.55 The court rejected the predatory
purpose claim based upon the record of the assistance the partnership gave to
Lawlis after disclosure of his alcoholism problem56 and upon looking at the
tary expulsion ofa partner." Id. Finally, the opinion quotes from the section of the partnership
agreement that includes the two-thirds provision. Id. at 439-40. In Lawlis's case, the difference
apparently is not of consequence as the expulsion vote was seven to one, with Lawlis casting
the sole dissenting vote. Id at 438.
48. Id. Lawlis asked for a fifty percent increase in his units of participation, from sixty
units to ninety units. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 440-41.




56. See id. at 440-41.
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full text of the internal memorandum cited.57
Lawlis also claimed the expulsion was constructively fraudulent because
it breached the partnership's fiduciary duty to exercise good faith and fair
dealing." The court did agree with Lawlis's assertion that partners owe each
other a "fiduciary duty... which requires each to exercise good faith and fair
dealing in partnership transactions and toward co-partners."59 Having estab-
lished the rule, the court explained why the fiduciary duty obligation to
exercise good faith and fair dealing "has no application to the facts of this
case."60 The Lawlis court addressed both procedural and substantive aspects
of good faith.6 Regarding substantive issues, the Lawlis court cited Holman
and narrowed the UPA Section 31 "bona fide" and "good faith" requirements
to concern only "the business aspects or property of the partnership."62
Regarding procedural issues, the Lawlis court noted the sophistication of the
partners involved 63 and the absence of procedural protections for partners
57. See id. at 441 n.2.
58. See id. 441-42. Lawlis also claimed the partnership breached its fiduciary duty to him
by expelling him for the economically predatory purpose of increasing partner income. See id.
at 441. The court collapsed the fiduciary duty claim into the assertion that the expulsion was
constructively fraudulent. See id.
59. See id. at 441-42.
60. See id. at 442.
61. See id. at 442-43.
62. See id. at 442 (citing Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515,523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).
Acknowledging that in Holman, the court did not supply a business retention reason, the Lawlis
court noted the political activities of one of the expelled partners in that case and opined that
"[s]ubstantially the same consideration present in Holman, i.e., potential damage to partnership
business, is present in this case." Id. The Lawlis court's statement is interesting because in
Holman, there was no business retention reason given for the expulsion, and in Lawlis, the
expulsion came after the expelled partner had resolved his substance abuse problem.
To make up for the apparent dearth of evidence that the partnership indeed discharged its
fiduciary obligation by finding that there was a threat to the partnership's business, the court
spent an extended paragraph explaining that a law partnership is a profit-seeking enterprise that
needs to be aware of its good will and favorable reputation. See id. The court apparently took
judicial notice of the "fact" that "[t]he lifeblood of any partnership contains two essential
ingredients, cash flow and profit, and the prime generators of that lifeblood are 'good will' and
a favorable reputation." Id. The Lawlis court concluded that: "[I]f a partner's propensity
toward alcohol has the potential to damage his firm's good will or reputation for astuteness in
the practice of law, simple prudence dictates the exercise of corrective action, as in Holman,
since the survival of the partnership itself potentially is at stake." Id. Apparently, underLawlis,
good faith and fair dealing do not require any inquiry into the magnitude of the threat to the
firm's survival and do not require a balancing of the marginal threat to the partnership with the
interest of the individual partner.
63. See id. ("All the parties involved in this litigation were legally competent and
consenting adults well educated in the law who initially dealt at arm's length while negotiating
the partnership agreements here involved."). The point about dealing at arm's length is curious
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being expelled.' The court then gave a new definition of good faith and fair
dealing:
Where the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to expel a partner
under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement freely negoti-
ated and entered into, the expelling partners act in "good faith" regardless
of motivation if that act does not cause a wrongful withholding of money
or property legally due the expelled partner at the time he is expelled."5
So narrowed, the Lawlis court declared, "'good faith' means '.. . a state of
mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title
or right: beliefthat one's conduct is not unconscionable.., absence of fraud,
deceit, collusion, or gross negligence. ' "
Applied to the facts in Lawlis, the court found the expulsion to have been
in good faith: "[t]he senior partners acted in the belief they had the legal right
to do so under the partnership agreement, as they did."'67 Indeed, far from
having a bad faith or predatory purpose, the fact that they allowed Lawlis to
continue to have a draw for some six months after his expulsion "demonstrates
a compassionate, not greedy, purpose.""8
Lawlis is important because it stands for the proposition that, under UPA
Section 31, if a partnership uses the expulsion power in bad faith or for a
predatory purpose the partnership agreement is violated and the expelled
partner has an action for damages suffered as a result of the expulsion.69
Lawlis is also important because the court confirmed that law partners owe
each other a fiduciary duty that requires the exercise of good faith and fair
dealing in internal partnership transactions." The problem in Lawlis is how
the court gave substance to the obligation. The Lawlis court adopted the
Holman view that for an expulsion to be wrongful, it must be undertaken for
as the record indicates that Lawlis joined the firm as an associate in 1966, left in 1969 to join
the in-house legal staff of a major client, and then rejoined the firm in 1971 as a partner. See
id. at 437. The partnership agreement at issue was signed in 1984. Id. at 438. Whether or not
Lawlis's characterization as one who "dealt at arm's length" is accurate as to Lawlis is one
question; however, it certainly is not true with respect to the many entry-level partners who
make their way through an extended period of being an associate only to be offered a partner-
ship after a number of years. The notion that such new partners "deal at ann's length" or
"negotiate" in any meaningful sense is absurd.
64. See id. at 442.
65. Id. at 442-43.
66. Id. at 443 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 440.
70. See id.
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improper economic reasons, to divert partnership business or property from
the expelled partner to the remaining partners."
C. Ehrlich v. Howe
Ehrlich v. Howe72 involves the claims of Ehrlich, who joined the Park
Avenue law firm of Sann & Howe as a lateral-entry partner.7' Six months
after Ehrlich joined the firm, he signed the partnership agreement, which he
claimed had been presented to him "on a 'take it or leave it' basis."'74 The
partnership agreement provided that:
[A] new partner shared joint and several liability for the debts, claims and
other liabilities of the Firm, but held no net asset ownership of it during his or
her first three years with the Firm. Rather, a new partner's interest in the
equity ofthe Firm vested upon the partner's third anniversary with the Firm. 75
71. See id. at 442. The Lawlis court was curiously unwilling simply to conclude that
Lawlis had failed to prove a predatory purpose. It went out of its way to construct, apart from
the record, a link between alcoholism and firm profitability. The court's decision raises two
questions, neither of which is answered in the Lawlis opinion. First, upon which party does the
burden relating to predation fall? The court was not clear, but having already found that Lawlis
failed to prove a predatory purpose, the second discussion of potential damage to the partner-
ship from Lawlis's alcoholism was necessary only if the partnership, and not the expelled
partner, had the burden of proof.
Assuming the burden is on the partnership to demonstrate its good faith, the second
question raised by the alcoholism discussion is: What is the appropriate standard? The court
started with the proposition that good faith is established "regardless of motivation if that act
does not cause a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled partner
at the time he is expelled." See id. at 442-43 (emphasis added). But the court appeared to
qualify this formulation: "Used in this context, 'good faith' means 'a state of mind indicating
honesty and lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title or right: belief that one's conduct
is not unconscionable...: absence of fraud, deceit, collusion, or gross negligence.. .. "' Id.
at 443 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)). The court then
selectively applied the standard. It ignored "a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness
of purpose" and concentrated on a "belief in one's legal title or right." 1d. Indeed, if one goes
to the full text of the definition cited, the retreat from "pay him what you owe him and show him
the door" becomes even more evident because the cited dictionary defines good faith as "a state
of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title or right: belief
that one's conduct is not unconscionable or that known circumstances do not require further
investigation: absence offraud, deceit, collusion, or gross negligence...." WEBSTER'STHIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976) (italicized to show deletions by court). The deleted
reference to the obligation to investigate indicates a substantive element to the good faith
judgment not present in the court's formulation.
72. 848 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). A prior ruling in the case, which provides some
background information, is reported at: Ehrlich v. Howe, No. 92 Civ. 1097 (PNL), 1992 WL
373266 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1992).
73. Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
74. Ehrlich, 1992 WL 373266, at *1.
75. Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 485. The court's recital may indicate that the partnership
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Two years and three months after he joined the firm, Ehrlich was ex-
pelled.76 In the course of the subsequent litigation he claimed "that he was
terminated for the purpose of preventing him from obtaining any rights to the
equity of the Firm."7 7 The parties agreed that Ehrlich would have been
entitled to share in over $300,000 in firm assets if he had not been expelled
prior to the third anniversary of his admission to the partnership.78
Interestingly, although Ehrlich presents an allegedly predatory expulsion,
the court did not address predation as bad faith as developed in Holman and
Lawlis. Rather, the court found for the plaintiff on a very narrow, pro-
cedurally-based theory. Ehrlich raised claims based on both federal law and
breach of contract. However, only the breach of contract claims are of impor-
tance to this discussion.79 Ehrlich's breach of contract claims revolved around
the procedures associated with his dismissal.0
The Ehrlich opinion begins with a finding that "[u]nder New York
law, partners have no common law or statutory right to expel another partner
from the partnership."'" The partnership agreement under which Ehrlich
was expelled provided that "[a] partner other than the senior partner may
be expelled from the Firm upon the affirmative vote of all the other part-
agreement modified the UPA provision, under which "[a] person admitted as a partner into an
existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before his admis-
sion as though he had been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except that this
liability shall be satisfied only out ofpartnership property." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 17, 6
U.L.A. 519 (1995) (emphasis added).
76. Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 485.
77. Id. Ehrlich advanced an even more predatory, if somewhat unclear claim: "Ehrlich
claim[ed] that he was terminated on the first business day when all partners were in the firm
after the date on which he could have withdrawn from the firm and 'locked-in' his vested right
to firm equity." Ehrlich, 1992 'YL 373266, at * 1. Judge Leval observed that "[i]t is not clear
what is the source of plaintiff's claim that voluntary withdrawal on his part would have given
him a right to participate in firm capital." Id. at * I n.1.
78. See Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 485.
79. Ehrlich brought federal law claims based on alleged violations of the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Consolidated Omnibus Reconcil-
iation Act of 1985 (COBRA). See Ehrlich v. Howe, No. 92 Civ. 1097 (PNL), 1992 WL
373266, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1992). The ERISA claim turned on whether Ehrlich, who was
a partner in the law firm, was an employee for purposes of ERISA. See id. at *4. Judge Leval,
in the first Ehrlich opinion, found that the motion to dismiss the ERISA claim "present[ed] a
close question" although he "doubt[ed Ehrlich's] claim could survive a motion for summary
judgment." Id. Indeed, Ehrlich's ERISA claim was subsequently dismissed upon summary
judgment. See Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482,486-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Judge Leval then
found that Ehrlich stated a valid cause of action under COBRA. See Ehrlich, 1992 WL 373266,
at *7. In the second reported opinion, the district court refused to grant either side summary
judgment on the COBRA claim. See Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 489-90.
80. See Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 490.
81. Id.
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ners."8 2 The Ehrlich opinion further provides that such contractual expulsion
provisions are required to be "strictly applied," 3 that all partnership agree-
ments "include 'an implied term of good faith,"'' and that the good faith
obligation in the partnership context is manifest as "a duty [that] rises to one




The specific process problem alleged by the plaintiff and found by the
court in Ehrlich was that the plaintiff was not given notice of the meeting at
which he was expelled. 6 The partnership agreement required that the expul-
sion proposal be presented "before the partnership," which the court found to
require passage in a forum to which all partners, including the partner about
to be expelled, had notice. 7 The lack of notice to the plaintiff constituted a
significant flaw in the expulsion process:
[I]n order for an expulsion vote to be "before the partnership," all of the
partners, including any partners whose expulsion is under consideration,
must be notified that the vote is taking place. This is an important right
conferred by the expulsion provisions in the Agreement because.., a
partner facing expulsion only needed to gamerthe support of one colleague
to avoid termination.8
Because the expulsion of Ehrlich without notice violated the terms of the
partnership agreement, which the court determined violated the fiduciary
duties owed to Ehrlich by the other partners, Ehrlich was awarded summary
judgment on his contract and fiduciary duty claims. 9
Ehrlich stands for the propositions that there is no common law right to
expel a partner (and no statutory right under New York law), that any contrac-
tual right to expel must be strictly followed to be effective, that partners owe
each other a duty of good faith in the expulsion context, and that the duty of
good faith is manifest as an obligation of the finest loyalty and honor most
sensitive, terms given substance by the provisions of the partnership agree-
ment.
82. Id. at 491 (quoting art. V, § 6 of partnership agreement). The partnership agreement
actually required unanimity, as the partner being expelled was prohibited from voting on his or
her own expulsion. See id. (quoting art. IV(b) of partnership agreement).
83. Id. at 490 ("A partnership agreement may provide for the expulsion of partners under
prescribed conditions, but such provisions are strictly applied.") (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 491 (quoting Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573,577 (N.Y. 1977)).
85. Id. (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
86. Id. at 490-91.
87. See id. at 491.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 492 ("Since the issue of Ehrlich's expulsion was not 'before the partnership,'




D. Dawson v. White & Case
The partnership agreement in Dawson v. White & Case' did not include
an expulsion provision." In order to oust the targeted partner, Dawson, the
firm was forced to dissolve and reform without him.' The reported case
involved Dawson's claims that the partnership's assets included goodwill that
was distributable in an accounting93 and that the firm's unfunded pension plan
was not a firm liability for accounting purposes. 4
E. Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro
In Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro9' the California Court of Appeal
upheld the expulsion of partner Philip Heller from Pillsbury Madison &
Sutro 6 Heller joined Pillsbury as a lateral partner in January 1990." 7 He
was expelled from the firm on June 11, 1992."8 The situation leading up
to Heller's expulsion included episodes of bizarre personal behavior,99 inap-
propriate professional behavior,"® a failure to achieve projected billable
90. 672N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996).
91. See Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996).
92. See id
93. See id at 592-93. The court rejected dictum in an earlier case and held that the
goodwill of a law firm might properly be included in an accounting, but found that it was not
properly included in the instant case.
94. The court found that the unfunded pension fund liability was not properly included
in the accounting as a firm liability. See id. at 594.
95. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Ct. App. 1996).
96. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 354 (Ct App. 1996).
97. Id. at 339.
98. Id at 342.
99. See id. at 340. For some reason, presumably related to the comparatively straight-
laced California lifestyle, the firm was uncomfortable with Heller's appearance in a popular
magazine:
Heller appeared in the Los Angeles magazine in an article entitled "Why L.A. Men
Won't Commit." The article described Heller as an attorney at Pillsbury, included
a photograph of Heller leaning against the Porsche car he owned at the time, and
quoted Heller as stating that he dates "an embarrassing number of women."
Id. It was reported thatHeller "was 'very disappointed' when he saw the Los Angeles magazine
article 'because it really doesn't reflect who I am or what I'm about."' Id. at 343.
100. See id. at 340. The court reported that Pillsbury lost an opportunity to do work for
Apple Computer because Heller attempted to bypass the firm's billing partner for Apple. See
id. He got the firm into a conflict situation involving Reebok. See id. Moreover, Heller's
bizarre and vaguely sexual communications with officials of Bank of America caused the firm
to come close to losing that client, which with its $6,000,000 to $8,000,000 in annual billings
was one of the firm's largest and most important See id. at 341.
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hours,' and a high percentage of uncollectable billings. 2
However, the record of Heller's behavior and performance was not
central to the case, for the Pillsbury partnership agreement did not require
cause and allowed the executive committee to expel a partner. 3 This they
did. In the subsequent litigation, Heller sought an accounting and asserted
five additional causes of action: breach of contract, breach of implied-in-law
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' Heller
was unsuccessful on all six causes of action at the trial level.105
On appeal, the Court of Appealtreated Heller's bad faith claim as part
of the second cause of action, for breach of the implied-in-law duty of good
faith and fair dealing contract provision." 6 The court, citingHolman, focused
on procedure as a proxy for good faith: "Where, as here, clear and integrated
law partnership agreements contain clauses authorizing expulsions through
'the guillotine approach,' and law partners are expelled pursuant to the
agreements, there is no breach of the duty of good faith."'
10 7
The Court of Appeal relied on the analysis of the Texas Court of Appeals
in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion0 8 when dealing with Heller's breach of fidu-
ciary duty claim."0 9 The Heller court started from the proposition that the
fiduciary duty owed by partners to each other "applies only to situations
where one partner could take advantage of his position to reap personal profit
or act to the partnership's detriment."" 0 The Heller court then cited Bohatch
101. See id. at 340. Heller apparently had predicted that he would generate upwards of
2200 billable hours for 1991. Early in the year his actual production was at an annual rate of
1200 billable hours. See id.
102. See id. In 1991, Heller collected only $230,522 of his $368,715 in billings. See id.
103. See id. at 346.
104. See id. at 343.
105. See id. In phase one of the bifurcated trial, the trial court ruled that the partnership
agreement in effect was "unambiguous, integrated and of full force." Id. The court rejected
Heller's parol evidence and concluded that Heller had been expelled in accordance with the
agreement. Id. The court dismissed with prejudice Heller's causes of action for breach of
contract, breach of implied-in-law contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id. The intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
claim was dismissed as to some defendants, submitted to the jury as to others. Id. The jury
deadlocked and the court declared a mistrial and enteredjudgment on defendants' motion. Id.
The defendants were awarded costs in the amount of $64,810.07. Id.
106. See id. at 346-47.
107. Id. at 347 (citing Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).
108. 905 S.W.2d 597 (Tex App. 1997); see infra Part 1.I (discussing Texas Court of
Appeals' analysis and decision in Bohatch).
109. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336,348 (Ct. App. 1996).




for the severely limited two-part formulation "that the fiduciary duty as to
partner expulsions is not to expel in bad faith" ' and "that the phrase 'bad
faith' in the context of an expelled partner 'means only that partners cannot
expel another partner for self-gain.'
1012
The court determined that Heller's expulsion "increased all Pillsbury
partners' profit shares."'1 Yet, because Pillsbury was a large firm and be-
cause "Heller was earning toward the lower end of the firm's compensation
range," 14 the court determined that "the increase was insubstantial" 5 and that
"the evidence [did] not show that defendants expelled Heller to enrich them-
selves at Heller's expense."
116
F. Winston & Strawn v. Nosal
In Winston & Strawn v. Nosal,"7 the expelled partner had been vocal for
some years in challenging the management of the firm and had made repeated
requests for access to firm financial documents in an attempt to prove self-
dealing on the part of management committee members."1 These attempts
culminated with Nosal presenting to the managing partner "a draft complaint
seeking enforcement of his right to inspect partnership records, for an ac-
counting, for damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and for a declaratory
judgment as to the partnership agreement.""1 9 The managing partner "tore up
the pleading," 12' and shortly thereafter, Nosal received a form memorandum
informing him that he was being "outplaced" from the firm.
In the Winston & Strawn partnership agreement," "there was no provi-
sion calling for a hearing, formal meeting, or 'just cause' showing prior to
111. Id. (citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App. 1995)).





117. 664 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); see also Callison, supra note 3, at 136 (discuss-
ing Nosal in detail).
118. See Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). The
appellate court cited repeated unsuccessful attempts by Nosal to gain access to firm financial




122. There was an issue as to which partnership agreement governed Nosal's termination.
Nosal claimed that the 1987 agreement, upon which the firm claimed to have acted, had not
been properly adopted and that the 1984 agreement governed. See id. at 242. The appellate
court determined that the question was moot because "there were sufficient votes to expelNosalboth under the 1984 and 1987 partnership agreements." Id at 246.
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expulsion."'" Nosal sued the firm, claiming that "his expulsion was void
because it was in violation of the implicit duty of good faith that exists be-
tween partners."'24 The firm responded in two ways: first, by disputing
Nosal's contention that he was expelled for seeking to exercise his inspection
rights"z and, second, by contending that the expulsion was proper because it
was approved by the requisite votes.
126
As to the substantive defense, the firm claimed that "Nosal was outplaced
because his interest in building a two-pronged tax and international trade
practice was incompatible with the interests and resources of the firm, and
because he had engaged in 'disturbing' conduct."'27 The appellate court found
that Nosal had raised a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the district court's
granting of summary judgment was inappropriate:
[The managing partner's] steadfast refusal ofNosal's access to records, his
role in the outplacement, and the fact that it occurred just after Nosal's
threatened lawsuit, raise an inference that Nosal was expelled solely be-
cause he persisted in invoking rights belonging to him under the partnership
agreement and that the reasons advanced by the firm were pretextual
28
As to the procedural defense that Nosal's expulsion comported with the
procedures required under the partnership agreement, the court found that
procedural compliance in the exercise of discretion to expel a partner does not
alone satisfy the good faith and fair dealing obligation: "Regardless of the
discretion conferred upon partners under a partnership agreement, this does
not abrogate their high duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing in the
execution of such discretion."' 29 Nosal is important in our analysis because
the court correctly differentiated between the procedural and the substantive
aspects of the duty of good faith and fair dealing3 and ruled that procedural
compliance with the terms of a partnership expulsion provision does not end
the substantive good faith and fair dealing inquiry.'
G. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft'12 involves the expulsion of
a partner from a branch office of a Wall Street firm who was apparently
123. Id. at 243.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 244.
126. Id. at 242.
127. Id. at 244.
128. Id. at 246.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 245-46.
131. See id.
132. No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
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caught up in a firm-wide downsizing effort."' Beasley, a lateral-entry whose
earlier practice led the court to characterize him as "an extraordinary rain-
maker, and a skilled litigator,"'34 became a partner in the firm's Palm Beach
office in 19892" In 1993, the share value of the Cadwalader firm declined,
and concern among some partners resulted in a substantial change in the
composition of the management committee." 6 Also in 1993, the Palm Beach
office operated at a loss for the first time since Beasley's arrival.3 7 The year
1994 saw an even larger decline in Cadwalader's share value. A group of
some fifteen "younger, more productive partners"'38 became upset at the
compensation situation and pressed the management committee for action.3 9
The management committee and the insurgents cooperated in an exercise
called "Project Right Size," which "was aimed at identifying less productive
partners for elimination from the partnership.' ' 40 The status of the Paim
Beach office became part of "Project Right Size," "with the common purpose
being to improve compensation to the remaining partners and retain the
disgruntled more productive partners.""'
The management committee voted to proceed with "Project Right Size,"
including the closure of the Palm Beach office. 2 Negotiations with the
targeted partners ensued, the firm and Beasley were unable to come to terms,
and Beasley initiated suit. 3 He advanced two substantive claims against
the partnership: first, that he was expelled from the partnership in violation
of the firm's partnership agreement'" and, second, that the firm's actions
violated its fiduciary duty owed to him. 5 He also advanced a claim for
133. Beasleyv. Cadwalader, Wickersham&Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL438777,
at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805, 97-
0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to award of
profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both parties),
opinionmodifiedonreh 'g,Nos. 96-2805,96-3818,97-0146,97-380,1998 WL904065 (Fla.Dist.
Ct. App. Dec. 30,1998);see also Callison, supra note 3, at 137-39 (discussingBeasleyin detail).
134. Id. at*1.
135. Id. at* 1; see Allan W. Vestal, "Assume aRatherLarge Boat... ": The Mess We Have
Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 489-92 (1997); Donald J. Weidner,
Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 877, 878-80 (1997).
136. Beasley, 1996 WL 438777, at *1.
137. Id.






144. Id at *3-*5.
145. Id at *5-*6.
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punitive damages.'46
The firm's partnership agreement did not contain an expulsion provi-
sion. 47 The judge in Beasley had already found that applicable New York
partnership law does not contain a common law or statutory provision for
expulsion unless one is provided in the partnership agreement. 4 The court
rejected the firm's defenses to the breach of contract claim and found in
Beasley's favor.'49
Beasley's breach of fiduciary duty claim apparently consisted of three
components: (1) thatthe firm expelled Beasley in contravention ofthe partner-
ship agreement, (2) that the firm failed to disclose the plans to close the Palm
Beach office and terminate its partners, and (3) that the motivation for the
expulsion was the financial gain of the remaining partners.15° Beasley won on
the fiduciary duty claim, apparently based on the third component of his claim:
These facts compel the conclusion thatthe management committee breached
its fiduciary duty to Beasley. This was not a situation where the manage-
ment committee was merely fulfilling its management function. Rather, it
was participating in aclandestine plan to wrongfully expel some partners for
the financial gain of other partners. Such activity cannot be said to be
honorable, much less to comport with "the punctilio of an honor."''
Thus, the breach of fiduciary duty claim in Beasley was decided on a factual
finding that the management committee was expelling Beasley to advantage
other partners financially. 5
H. Ruskin v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
Ruskin v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft'53 is in a sense a companion
case to Beasley. Like Beasley, Ruskin grew out of a partner expulsion under-
146. Id. at *7.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805, 97-0146, 97-
380, 1998 WL 405919, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to award of
profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both parties),
opinion modified on reh'g, Nos. 96-2805, 96-3818, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 904065 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998).
149. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL 438777,
at *4-*5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805,
97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to award
of profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both parties),
opinion modified on reh 'g, Nos. 96-2805, 96-3818, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 904065 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998).
150. See id. at*5.
151. Id. at *6 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
152. See id.
153. Ruskin, ajury trial, is not the subject of a reported opinion. News reports of the case
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taken as part of "Project Right Size."'5 4 In this case, partner Steven A. Ruskin
claimed that he was expelled from the firm in violation of the partnership
agreement.' The firm countered that Ruskin elected to leave the firm volun-
tarily when his compensation was reduced to a fixed salary roughly half of his
pre-reduction level of compensation.'56 Ruskin, who had been with the firm
for twenty-two years, claimed that the reduction in salary was used to force
him out of the firm. 7 Ruskin was awarded $1,400,000 in lost past earnings
and $1,600,000 in lost future earnings. 8 For the second phase of the trial, the
court reserved the question of what compensation, if any, Ruskin was due for
his pro rata portion of the firm's assets.'59
L Bohatch v. Butler & Binion
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion6 ° is the recently decided Texas Supreme
Court case that addresses whether it constitutes bad faith for a law partnership
to expel a partner who reports the suspected unethical conduct of another
partner to the management committee.' Bohatch was a partner in the three-
attorney Washington, D.C. office of Texas-based Butler & Binion. 62 A
former Deputy Assistant General Counsel at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Bohatch worked almost exclusively for Pennzoil, as did the
other attorneys in the office.
6
1
Once a partner, Bohatch became concerned that one of the other partners
in the Washington, D.C. office was over-billing Pennzoil.'" She took her
concerns to another Washington, D.C. partner, and the two of them reviewed
and copied records relating to the time records of the suspect partner. 65
Following this investigation, Bohatch took her concerns to the firm's manag-
provide some background. See Daniel Wise, Trial Over Ousting ofFirm Partner Opens, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 17, 1997, at 1; Dean Starkman, Cadwalader Loses Lawsuit Brought By Former
Partner, WAi ST. J., Dec. 23, 1997, at B5.
154. Wise, supra note 153.
155. See Starkman, supra note 153.
156. See Wise, supra note 153.
157. See id.
158. See Starkman, supra note 153.
159. See id.
160. No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998).
161. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *1 (Tex. Jan. 22,
1998). The Texas Court of Appeals decision is Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. App. 1997); see also Callison, supra note 3, at 135-36 (discussing Bohatch in detail).
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ing partner and then to other members of the management committee. 6 6 The
management committee investigated her concerns, discussed the matter with
the client, and concluded that there was no basis for Bohatch's contentions.1
67
The day following Bohatch's initial discussion with the firm's managing
partner, the suspect partner "informed her that Pennzoil was not satisfied with
her work and wanted her work to be supervised."'68 Following the manage-
ment committee's investigation and conclusion that her contentions were
without basis, Bohatch was told "that she should begin looking for other
employment."'69
Eventually, Bohatch found new employment, and the partnership for-
mally voted to expel her. 7 Bohatch sued, and the trial court granted partial
summary judgment for the firm on the wrongful discharge claim, the breach
of fiduciary duty claim, and the breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing claim relating to the period following the formal expulsion.' 7' The
trial court denied the firm's motion for summary judgment on the breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claims for
the period prior to Bohatch's formal expulsion." These parts of the case
went to the jury, which found in Bohatcli's favor."
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the critical duty
of good faith and fair dealing claim. 74 The intermediate appellate court cited
Holman and Lawlis and held that "partners have a general fiduciary duty not
to expel other partners from the partnership in bad faith. 'Bad faith' in this





170. Id. at *2.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. The jury awarded Bohatch $57,000 for lost wages, $250,000 for mental
anguish, $4,000,000 in punitive damages, and attorney fees. Id. The court excluded the award
of attorney fees and secured a remittitur in the $4,000,000 punitive damage award to $237,000.
Id.
174. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App. 1997).
175. Id. at 602 (citations omitted). The Bohatch intermediate appellate court acknowl-
edged the jury's finding that the defendants failed to act in the utmost good faith and acted with
an intent to gain an additional benefit for themselves, but the court of appeals held that the jury
findings were not supported by the evidence. See id. at 603. Reading the instructions and the
jury answers to questions on the verdict form in the light most favorable to the appellee, the
court of appeals held that the jury answered the critical questions in Bohatch's favor:
Taken together, question 2A on breach of fiduciary duty (whether the defendants
failed to act "in the utmost good faith") and question 5 on punitive damages
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The court of appeals found that the firm did not expel Bohatch because of
a fear that it would lose the Pennzoil business. In fact, the firm disclosed
Bohatch's concerns aboutthe billings to the client, and the client satisfied itself
that the billings were proper and did not remove its business. 76 As to Bo-
hatch's claim that the expulsion was predatory, that is, motivated by a desire to
take her partnership interest, the court of appeals was dismissive: "Bohatch...
argues that she was expelled so that the other partners could acquire her part-
nership interest. Bohatch's partnership share was so small, however, that the
jury could not have reasonably concluded that the partners' expulsion of
Bohatch was motivated by their desire to acquire her partnership share."'"
Finally, the court of appeals used the forbearance of the firm in not
expelling Bohatch earlier to counter the predatory purpose claim. The court
noted that the firm could have expelled Bohatch when she raised her con-
cerns 178 or when they found her concerns to be without foundation.179
Instead, the partners on the management committee chose the "step down"
severance rather than the "guillotine" severance permitted by the partner-
ship agreement. They allowed Bohatch to continue as a partner, paying her
a monthly draw, allowing her to use firm resources, and providing her with
insurance coverage until she found other employment. Such conduct does
not demonstrate a purpose of self gain.18
0
The court of appeals found for Bohatch on the relatively unimportant contract
claim and the lost earnings claim, for a total compensatory award of $3 5,000,
no punitive damages, and $225,000 in attorney fees.'
Although the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's judg-
ment, its rationale differed from that of the intermediate appellate court and
is, therefore, worth examining." The court's analysis began with a recogni-
(whether Paine, Bums, and McDonald "acted with an intent to gain an additional
benefit for [themselves]") addresses the issue of whether the firm, acting through
its partners, expelled Bohatch in bad faith (for self gain). Although the jury
answered these questions in Bohatch's favor, we find that the answers are not
supported by the evidence.
Id.
176. Id. at 603-04.
177. Id. at 604..
178. Id The partnership agreement allowed for immediate expulsion of Bohatch when
she made her concerns known, "without stating a reason or conducting an investigation." Id.
Nevertheless, the firm did an investigation of Bohatch's concerns. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
181. See id at 608.
182. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at * 1-'5 (Tex. Jan.
22, 1998). The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in a majority opinion by
1107
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1083 (1998)
tion of the common law rule "that '[t]he relationship between ... partners...
is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the participants the obligation
of loyalty to the joint concern and of the utmost good faith, fairness, and
honesty in their dealings with each other with respect to matters pertaining to
the enterprise."" 83 But the court then cited as a countervailing proposition the
assertion that "partners have no obligation to remain partners; 'at the heart of
the partnership concept is the principle that partners may choose with whom
they wish to be associated."" 8 The court framed the issue presented as
"whether the fiduciary relationship between and among partners creates an
exception to the at-will nature of partnerships; that is, in this case, whether it
gives rise to a duty not to expel a partnerwho reports suspected overbilling by
another partner."'85
The Texas Supreme Court marshaled cases for the propositions that "a
partnership may expel a partner for purely business reasons,"8 6 "that a law firm
can expel a partner to protect relationships both within the firm and with
clients,"'87 and "that a partnership can expel a partner without breaching any
duty in order to resolve a 'fundamental schism.""8 8 The court declined "to
recognize that public policy requires a limited duty to remain partners - i.e., a
partnership must retain a whistleblower partner,"" 9 and held that "the firm did
not owe Bohatch a duty not to expel her for reporting suspected overbilling by
another partner."'"9 Using this analysis, the court concluded that "[t]he fidu-
ciary duty that partners owe one another does not encompass a duty to remain
partners or else answer in tort damages."'' This statement is at once both
correct as far as it reaches and essentially irrelevant to the case at hand.'92
Justice Enoch, joined by Justices Gonzalez, Owen, Baker, and Hankinson. See id. at * 1-*5.
Justice Hecht filed a lengthy concurring opinion. See id. at *5-* 19 (Hecht, J., concurring).
Justice Spector filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Phillipsjoined. See id. at* 19-
*23 (Spector, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at *2 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex. 1951)).
184. Id. (quoting Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
187. Id. (citing Lawlis v. Kightling & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990);
Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).
188. Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at *4.
190. Id. at *5.
191. Id. at *4.
192. In his concurrence, Justice Hecht agreed with this assessment: "The Court... mis-
states the issue when it says that '[t]he fiduciary duty that partners owe one another does not
encompass a duty to remain partners.' The statement is correct, of course, but it has nothing to
do with Bohatch's claim." Id. at* 16 (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion,
No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *4 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998)). The discussion shifts somewhat if
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But what of the duty of good faith and fair dealing from which the
analysis started? Properly viewed, the issue in Bohatch was not whether the
partnership was an at-will partnership for purposes of dissolution; rather, the
issue was whether the partners fulfilled the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing that they owed Bohatch as a result of her status as a partner. Having
started with a recognition of the common law rule "that '[t]he relationship
between... partners... is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the
participants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern and of the utmost
good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings with each other with respect
to matters pertaining to the enterprise,""' 93 the Bohatch court lost its bearings
and wandered off course.
The concurrence by Justice Hecht is more helpful and significantly more
nuanced than the majority opinion. Justice Hecht discussed at some length the
suggestion that good faith in the expulsion context prohibits only economic
predation.'94 He observed that economic gain of the remaining partners is
present even in situations in which the expulsion is upheld:
Despite statements in these cases that partners cannot expel one of their
number for personal profit, in each instance the expelling partners believed
that retaining the partner would hurt the firm financially and that the firm-
and thus the partners themselves - stood to benefit from the expulsion. It
is therefore far too simplistic to say, as the court of appeals held, that
partners cannot expel a partner for personal financial benefit; if expulsion
of a partner to protect the firm's reputation or preserve its relationship with
a client benefits the firm financially, it perforce benefits the members of
the firm. If expulsion of a partner can be in breach of a fiduciary duty, the
circumstances must be more precisely defined.195
Justice Hecht cited with apparent approval the analysis of the New York Court
of Appeals in Gelder Medical Group v. Webber,'96 a physician partnership
case.'97 Justice Hecht noted that the Gelder court indicated "that bad faith
one attempts to recast the dissolution option as variation of expulsion. The problem with this
approach is that the targeted partner has statutory rights in the dissolution process that, unless
waived, give the target significant leverage. See UNuF. PARTNERSHIPACT § 38(2), 6 U.L.A. 880-
81 (1995). Absent an effective agreement modifying the statutory provisions, the court's
statement would have to be revised for the dissolution context: The duty that partners owe one
another does encompass a duty to remain partners or else answer in damages ifthe dissolution
is in contravention of the partnership agreement or if the dissolving partners deny the target
her statutory and contractual rights in dissolution.
193. Bohatch, 1998 WL 19482, at *2 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256,264
(Tex. 1951)).
194. See id. at *10-*13 (Hecht, J., concurring).
195. Id. at *12 (Hecht, J., concurring).
196. 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977).
197. Bohatch, 1998 WL 19482, at * 12-* 13 (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Gelder Med.
Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (N.Y. 1977)).
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might limit the otherwise absolute language of the [partnership] agreement."1 98
However, Justice Hecht then observed that the Gelder court argued, "[e]ven
if bad faith on the part of the remaining partners would nullify the right to
expel one of their number, it does not follow that under an agreement permit-
ting expulsion without cause the remaining partners have the burden of estab-
lishing good faith." '199 The solution in Gelder, which Justice Hecht appeared
to find persuasive, was to allow the expelled partner to establish the bad faith
of the expelling partners.2" What would be the test for bad faith? Using the
Gelder analysis, Justice Hecht suggested "'bad faith going to the essence,' or
an 'evil, malevolent, or predatory purpose." 2 "
Justice Hecht did not suggest the answer to the ultimate question: Is a
partner who alleges unethical behavior on the part of another partner without
adequate proof shielded from expulsion? Like the majority, he was troubled
by the suggestion that partners would be forced to remain in a partnership
with a partner who has perhaps demonstrated seriously flawed judgment.2'
On that basis, Justice Hecht concurred in the majority's judgment. 3
J Synthesis: The Present State of the Law
So what is the present state of the law of law partner expulsions? If we
return to the two-part inquiry of substance and process, the present body of
law can be summarized quickly.
Regarding substance, we start with the proposition that there is no
common-law or statutory right of expulsion.2 The cases and authorities
agree that there is no common-law right to expel a partner from a law partner-
ship.2"5 Nor is there a statutory right to expel, although both the UPA and
198. Id. at* 12 (Hecht, J., concurring) (quoting GelderMed. Group, 363 N.E.2d at576-77).
199. Id. at * 13 (Hecht, J., concurring) (quoting GelderMed. Group, 363 N.E.2d at 576-77).
200. See id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
201. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
202. See id. at *4 (Hecht, J., concurring).
203. Id. at *15 (Hecht, J., concurring).
204. There is, of course, a statutory right of dissolution. See UWnI. PARTNERSHIPACT § 31,
6 U.L.A. 771 (1995). Because of the statutory protections afforded a targeted partner in a
dissolution, the purpose of which is to reform the partnership without the target, what I have
termed a"collusive dissolution," however, I do not include dissolutions in the term "expulsion."
See UNM. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31, 38(2), 6 U.L.A. 771, 880-81 (1995).
205. See Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating thatNew York
law provides no common-law or statutory right to expel partner); Beasley v. Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL 449247, at * I (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1996)
(finding no common law right of expulsion under New York law); Dawson v. White & Case,
672 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y. 1996) (observing that in absence of termination mechanism in
partnership agreement, partners can only remove partner through dissolution); Bohatchv. Butler
& Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *2 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998) ("We have long recognized
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RUPA provide that contractual expulsion provisions will be given effect.2°6
The right to expel arises, if at all, -from the partnership agreement. °7
If a right to expel is provided, it may be either with or without cause. If
the agreement is silent as to cause, courts generally hold that a cause require-
ment is not read into the expulsion provision.20 1 Courts will enforce contrac-
as a matter of common law that '[t]he relationship between... partners... is fiduciary in
character, and imposes upon all the participants the obligation of loyalty to thejoint concern and
of the utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings with each other with respect to
matters pertaining to the enterprise."') (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256,264 (Tex.
1951 ));Id. at*9 (Hecht, J., concurring). Profesr Hillman's authoritative treatise is in accord.
See HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.2, at 5:6. F
The general authorities on partnership law are in agreement on this point. See CLEMENT
BATES, I THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 241, at 240-41 (1888) ("Like all provisions for forfei-
tures, [a power of expulsion] ... does not exist unless expressly conferred."); J. WILLIAM
CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 15.06,
at 15-17 to 15-18 (1997) ("[T]he UPA contemplates that partners may establish a contracted
basis for removing an undesirable partner."); NATHANIELL1NDLEYET AL., 2 A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 1263-64 (Marshall D. Ewell ed., 2d American ed. 1888) ("In the absence
of an express agreement to that effect, there is no right on the part of any of the members of an
ordinary partnership to expel any other member."); SHUMAKER, supra note 12, § 101, at 174
("No majority of the partners can expel any partner unless a power to do so has been conferred
by express agreement between the partners.").
206. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 3 1(d), 6 U.L.A. 880 (1995) ("[T]he expulsion of any
partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement
between the partners."). UPA Section 38 refers to the "expulsion of a partner, bona fide under
the partnership agreement." Id. § 38(1); see also REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 601(4) -
601(5), 6 U.L.A. 73 (1995).
207. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL
438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805,
97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to award
of profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both parties),
opinion modified on reh'g, Nos. 96-2805, 96-3818, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 904065 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998); Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-
AJ, 1996 WL 449247, at *I (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1996) (strictly construing partnership
agreement when power to expel is not express); Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589,
591-92 (N.Y. 1996) ("[W]e have held that a partnership agreement may contain a termination
provision or some other mechanism by which to remove a partner. Absent such a mechanism,
however, the removal of a partner can be accomplished only through dissolution of the firm,
defined as a 'change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associ-
ated in the carrying on... of the business."' (citations omitted)).
208. See HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.4.1, at 5:10 to 5:11. Professor Hillman finds that
"[tihe sparse authority that exists under the UPA indicates that the absence of a cause standard
in the expulsion clause eliminates the need to establish cause." Id. Hillman also notes:
The question of whether a cause requirement should be implied when an expulsion
clause does not address the subject, or is unclear, has been a source of litigation for
more than a century. Invariably, courts have rejected challenges to expulsions
offered on this basis and thereby have displayed a willingness to resolve ambigu-
ities against the partner contesting the expulsion.
Hillman, supra note 12, at 567 (footnote omitted).
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tual cause requirements.0 9
If a right to expel is provided, its exercise must be consistent with the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.210 An expulsion motivated by an economi-
cally predatory purpose does not comport with the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.2 ' Authority exists for the proposition that an expulsion motivated by
209. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 346 (Ct. App. 1996)
(noting "partnership agreement not only contains no language requiring expulsions [be] for
cause, but also states the partners' reserved powers include the right to 'expel any Partner from
the partnership without cause"'); Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996) (noting no "just cause" requirement under applicable partnership agreement); Lawlis
v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to "engrafto a 'for
cause' requirement upon the agreement when such was not the intent of the parties"); Holman
v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (noting agreement does not require cause for
expulsion and declining to impose cause requirement).
210. See Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[AIIl partnership
agreements in New York include 'an implied term of good faith."' (citing Gelder Med. Group
v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977))); Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 ("[Ihe
fiduciary duty is not to expel in bad faith."); Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 244-45 ("[E]ach partner is
bound to exercise the utmost good faith and honesty in all matters relating to the partnership
business."); Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 440,442 (citing IND. CODEANN. § 23-4-1-31(l)(d) (Michie
1971) for proposition that "if the power to involuntarily expel partners granted by a partnership
agreement is exercised in bad faith.., the partnership agreement is violated"); Holman, 522
P.2d at 523-24 ("Undoubtedly, the general rule of law is that the partners in their dealings with
each other must exercise good faith.... In every contract, including partnership agreements,
there is an implied covenant of good faith, fair dealing and cooperation by the parties to the
contract." (citation omitted)). Professor Hillman refers to "the overriding standard of good-faith
applicable to dealings among partners." HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.4, at 5:9; see also
CALLISON, supra note 205, § 15.06, at 15-19 to 15-20 ("UPA § 31(1)(d) requires that the
expulsion be bona fide under the partnership agreement and prevents bad faith expulsions.");
LINDLEY ET AL., supra note 205, at 984 ("The court cannot control the exercise of a power to
expel if it is exercised bonafide." (citing Russell v. Russell, 14 Ch. D. 471 (1880); Steuart v.
Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 626 (1878)); id. at 1074 ("Powers of expulsion are always construed
strictly, and, unless they are exercised with perfect good faith, the expulsion will be declared
void.. . ."); SHUMAKER, supra note 12, § 101, at 174 ("Where a power of expulsion is con-
ferred, it can only be exercised in good faith .... ).
211. See Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 ("mhe phrase 'bad faith' in the context of an
expelled partner 'means only that the partners cannot expel another partner for self-gain."');
Beasley, 1996 WL 438777, at *5-*6 ("[T]he management committee was participating in a
clandestine plan to wrongfully expel some partners for the financial gain of other partners.");
Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 244-45 ("[The obligation of] utmost good faith and honesty in all matters
relating to the partnership business... prohibits all forms of secret dealings and self-preferences
in any matter 'relating to and connected with a partnership."' (quoting Bakalis v. Bressler, 115
N.E.2d 323, 327 (l1. 1953))); Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442 (same (citing Holman, 522 P.2d at
523)); Holman, 522 P.2d at 523 ("[T]he personal relationships between partners to which the
terms 'bona fide' and 'good faith' relate are those which have a bearing upon the business
aspects or property of the partnership and prohibit a partner, to-wit, a fuduciary [sic], from
taking any personal advantage touching those subjects."). Professor Hillman acknowledges the
predatory purpose line of cases and raises questions as to their meaning and usefulness. See
HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.4.3, at 5:12-5:17; see also SHUMAKER, supra note 12, § 101, at
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other than an economically predatory purpose cannot be challenged on sub-
stantive grounds.2" 2 Other authority, however, suggests that good faith and
fairness may be violated by motivations not immediately economically preda-
tory, such as a motivation to thwart the exercise of partner rights.2"3
Regarding process, we start with the proposition that there is no
common-law or statutory right to a particular procedure in the expulsion con-
text. Process is a matter of grace, not of right, absent an agreement estab-
lishing procedural requirements.2 4 Again, Holman sets the basic argument.
The court in Holman rejected the expelled partners' argument that procedural
protections should be either implied in the agreement or imposed as a matter
of law.21 5 The court noted that the agreement did not contain any procedural
protections and that it had been drafted and executed by knowledgeable,
experienced, and proficient lawyers. The Holman court did not impose any
procedural requirements:
174 ("Where a power of expulsion is conferred, it can only be exercised in good faith, with a
view to the benefit of the firm, and not for the private benefit of any of the partners .... ).
212. See Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347-48 ("Although partners owe each other a fiduciary
duty, this duty applies only to situations where one partner could take advantage of his position
to reap personal benefit."); Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442-43 ("Where the remaining partners in a
firm deem it necessary to expel a partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership
agreement freely negotiated and entered into, the expelling partners act in 'good faith' regard-
less of motivation if that act does not cause awrongful withholding of money or property legally
due the expelled partner at the time he is expelled."); Holman, 522 P.2d at 523-24 ("[The
personal relationships between partners to which 'bona fide'and 'good faith' relate are those
which have a bearing upon the business aspects or property of the partnership and prohibit a
partner, to-wit, a fuduciary [sic], from taking any personal advantage touching those subjects.").
213. See Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 246 (finding "an inference that Nosal was expelled solely
because he persisted in invoking rights belonging to him under the partnership agreement").
214. See Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at347 ("Where, as here, clear and integrated law partner-
ship agreements contain clauses authorizing expulsions through 'the guillotine approach,' and
law partners are expelled pursuant to the agreements, there is no breach of the duty of good
faith."); Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 245 (noting that "the partnership agreement places no restriction
upon the expulsion of a partner other than approval by the requisite majority"); Lawlis, 562
N.E.2d at 442 ("[It] is apparent [the partners] believed.., the 'guillotine method' of involun-
tary severance, that is, no notice or hearing, only a severance vote to terminate a partner invol-
untarily need be taken, would be in the best interests of the partnership. Their intent was to
provide a simple, practical, and above all, a speedy method of separating a partner from the
firm, if that ever became necessary for any reason. We find no fault with that approach to
severance."); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 521-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("We find this
partnership agreement to [be] unambiguous, and not to require notice, reasons, or an opportu-
nity to be heard. To inject those issues would be to rewrite the agreement of the parties, a
function we neither presume nor assume."). Professor Hillman finds that "United States
decisions have minimized the importance of the process underlying expulsions." HILLMAN,
supra note 39, § 5.3.5.1, at 5:20; see also CALLISON, supra note 205, § 15.06 at 15-21; Callison,
supra note 3, at 142-43.
215. See Holman, 522 P.2d at 521.
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In this case the express language of the partnership agreement itself must
be controlling; that language clearly does not contain any of the require-
ments plaintiffs now seek to assert as impliedly applicable. Where terms
of a contract, taken as a whole, are plain and unambiguous, the meaning is
to be deduced from the contract alone. We note further there is no evi-
dence of the partners' intention at the time of drafting the present partner-
ship agreement. They merely included the word "expulsion" without
setting forth any requirements for executing such a procedure other than a
vote of the executive committee.... We find this partnership agreement
to [be] unambiguous, and not to require notice, reasons, or an opportunity
to be heard. To inject those issues would be to rewrite the agreement of
the parties, a function we neither presume nor assume.216
The Holman court rejected the argument that expelled partners have a right
to some procedural safeguards:
These parties in writing the partnership clauses dealing with expulsion, and
the defendants who carried them out, chose to adoptthe guillotine approach,
rather than a more diplomatic approach, to the expulsion of partners. The
actions of defendants were within the contemplation of the agreement.
While this course of action may shock the sensibilities of some, to others it
may be that once the initial decision is made, the traumatic reaction to that
decision is more quickly overcome and the end result more merciful.
217
The split on process in the present regime comes not on the question of
what process is due. Rather, the split arises on the more limited question of
whether, once agreed to by the partners, procedural requirements are to be
strictly enforced. Ehrlich v. Howe stands for the proposition that procedural
provisions must be strictly enforced.2 18 Other decisions are less strict in the
enforcement of procedural requirements. In Holman, for example, the rules
of procedure for the executive committee required that the committee give
members an agenda of topics to be discussed at each executive committee
meeting.2"9 The Holmans were members of the executive committee; how-
ever, the committee did not give them agendas listing their expulsions as a
topic to be discussed." Nevertheless, the court refused to hold the resulting
expulsion unlawful."
216. Id. at 523 (citation omitted).
217. Id. at 524.
218. See Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("A partnership
agreement may provide for the expulsion of partners under prescribed conditions, but such
provisions are strictly applied.").
219. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
220. See id. (finding that neither plaintiff was given notice).
221. See id. at 521.
It is true there was no agenda provided to plaintiffs prior to the May 13 meeting as
is suggested or recommended by the supplementary rules. However, both plaintiffs
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Finally, there is a useful reminder in Nosal that compliance with process
is not alone sufficient to satisfy the good faith and fairness obligation: "Re-
gardless of the discretion conferred upon partners under a partnership agree-
ment, this does not abrogate their high duty to exercise good faith and fair
dealing in the execution of such discretion."'
1I. A Critique of the Present Regime and a Proposal for Reform
Recent decisions in the area of law partner expulsions raise questions
about our continued reliance upon Holman and its progeny. On the substan-
tive side, the concurrence in Bohatch challenges the underlying analysis for
the economic predation test.' Nosal suggests that there may be reasons for
expulsions that are not directly economically predatory but that should never-
theless be deemed impermissible. 4 The Bohatch and Heller decisions raise
the disturbing possibility that, under Holman and its progeny, junior partners
in large firms have no meaningful protection under the good faith and fairness
standard.' On the procedural side, Ehrlich challenges the more casual
attitude of Holman toward process. 6 It may be time to revisit Holman and
its progeny to see if they got the issues right. On both the substantive and
procedural sides, there are reasons to think that the existing regime is in error.
A. Substance
On the substance side, there are two questions that might profitably be
revisited. The first is how the fiduciary and contractual charges to good faith
and fairness get translated from general partner obligations into reasonably
specific rules by which to judge law partner behavior in the expulsion context.
The second question is how courts should deal with cause where the partner-
ship agreement is silent on the question of whether cause need be shown as a
predicate for the expulsion.
testified that they believed their possible termination with the firm would be the
subject of the 8 p.m. May 13 meeting; William Holman had been informed that
afternoon that their relationship with the finm was to be a topic of discussion. We
do not find the failure to provide an agenda was a sufficient violation ofthe partner-
ship agreement to justify holding there was an unlawful expulsion of the plaintiffs.
Id
222. Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664N.E.2d 239, 246 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
223. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Hecht's concur-
rence in Bohatch).
224. See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text (summarizing opinion in Nosal).
225. See supra notes 95-116, 160-203 (explaining Heller and Bohatch).
226. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (discussing Ehrlich).
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1. Good Faith and Fairness
What does it mean to comport with the underlying charge of good faith
and fairness in the law partner expulsion process? It is at least not obviously
correct that the appropriate translation of the general fiduciary good faith and
fairness injunction, to act with utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty, is
simply "do not steal money from your partners when you throw them out."'
Nor is it even clear that the contractual good faith and fairness injunction could
be so narrowly construed. And yet that is the essence of what the Washington
Court of Appeals said in Holman2 2. and what the successive decisions by the
Indiana Court of Appeals in Lawlis,"9 the California Court of Appeal in
Heller,"° and the Texas Court of Appeals in Bohatch 2 have stated. Is it
possible that the Holman court simply got it wrong? Perhaps, because the only
authority cited by the Holman court cannot withstand closer scrutiny.
In deciding whether the Holman court correctly translated the "good faith
and fairness" requirement, it is interesting to examine how that court arrived
at the suggestion that good faith and fairness equate to a lack of economic
predation and no more. The court first traced the requirement of good faith
from the UPA Section 31 language that "[d]issolution is paused... [without
violation of the agreement between the partners b]y the expulsion of any
partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power con-
ferred by the agreement between the partners."'22 The court then noted "the
general rule of law. . . that the partners in their dealings with each other must
exercise good faith."' 3 The court inserted the obligatory quotation from
Meinhard v. Salmon,"2 4 and then proceeded to narrow dramatically the scope
of the good faith and fair dealing charge:
227. Professor Hillman presents a rather understated analysis on this point. Working from
the "bona fide" requirement under UPA Sections 31 and 38, he correctly notes that good faith
governs all aspects of the partners' relations inter se. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 563. After
noting that it is "curious" that the bona fide requirement is added to the expulsion sections, he
suggests that "[iut is unlikely.., that the drafters meant to suggest that courts should apply a
relaxed standard to expulsions." Id. at 564. He suggests that the narrowing of good faith under
Holman is incorrect. Id. at 564 n. 158. "It is far more reasonable," he concludes, "to assume that
the potential severity ofexpulsions prompted the drafters to emphasize that expulsions are major
events that should be reviewed against a standard at least as stringent as the standard that gener-
ally governs the relations of partners." Id. at 564.
228. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
229. See Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
230. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 348 (Ct. App. 1996).
231. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App. 1995).
232. See Holman, 522 P.2d at 523 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 25.04.310 (1994) (Washing-
ton's enactment of UPA Section 31)).
233. Id.
234. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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Likewise, a partner is not permitted to derive any profit or advantage from
the partnership relationship except with the full knowledge and consent of
the partners. That such is the law cannot be questioned.... However, the
personal relationships between partners to which the terms "bonafide"
and "goodfaith" relate are those which have a bearing upon the business
aspects or property of the partnership and prohibit a partner, to-wit, a
fuduciary [sic], from taking any personal advantage touching those
subjects. Plaintiffs' claims do not relate to the business aspects or property
rights of this partnership. There is no evidence the purpose of the sever-
ance was to gain any business or property advantage to the remaining
partners. Consequently, in that context, there has been no showing of
breach of the duty of good faith toward plaintiffs.235
The key transition in the narrowing paragraph is the assertion that "the
personal relationships between partners to which the terms 'bona fide' and
'good faith' relate are those which have a bearing upon the business aspects
or property of the partnership and prohibit a partner, to-wit, a fuduciary [sic],
from taking any personal advantage touching those subjects." 26 The Holman
court cited only one authority for this critical proposition: Rees v. Briscoe.23
There are two problems with the Holman court's use of Rees. First, Rees is
not a partnership expulsion case. In fact, it is not even technically a partner-
ship case. Second, and more importantly, Rees does not stand fairly for the
proposition for which it is cited by the Holman court.
As to the first point, Rees is an oil and gas case."3 Even granting that the
arcane world of oil and gas leases and participations has connections with
partnership law, and remembering that good partnership law has been made
in non-partnership cases - Meinhard v. Salmon is, after all, a joint venture
case 9- it seems passing strange that the Washington Court of Appeals would
have felt the need to venture into Oklahoma oil and gas law to find a source
of law for the critical argument in the Holman opinion.
As to the second point, Rees cannot be read fairly to stand forthe proposi-
tion for which it is cited by the Holman court. In Rees, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, over a vigorous and well-reasoned dissent, established a constructive
trust over an interest in a mineral lease.24 Rees, the plaintiff, had assigned
several oil and gas leases to Briscoe for no consideration except Briscoe's
promise to drill on the leases and Rees's retention of a 1/8 of 7/8 working
235. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
236. Id.
237. 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
238. See Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758, 759 (Okla. 1957).
239. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 545 (N.Y. 1928).
240. See Rees, 315 P.2d at 762-63.
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interest. 4' Briscoe drilled one producing well, but delayed drilling on the other
leases. 2 Rees's underlying interest expired, and Briscoe received oil and gas
leases on the same tracts from the mineral estate owners, without Rees's 1/8 of
7/8 working interest. 3 Rees sued to have a constructive trust imposed on the
1/8 of 7/8 working interest.2 " The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and imposed a constructive trust.24 5 The court based its judgment on the
finding that Rees and Briscoe had a relation of confidence because "[n]o
business man would donate his leases to another under such circumstances
unless he had confidence in his assignee., 246 The part of the opinion in Rees
to which the Holman court apparently was looking - and it is difficult to
discern what portion of Rees the Holman court relied on because the court did
nothing more than cite to the case as a whole247 - was a series of citations used
by the Oklahoma court to establish the proposition that when a person grants
a second person an interest in property, a fiduciary relationship is established
that prohibits the second person from acquiring rights in the subject property
that are antagonistic to the rights of the first person. 8
It is a long stretch from the holding in Rees to the Holman court's asser-
tion that "the personal relationships between partners to which the terms 'bona
fide' and 'good faith' relate are those which have a bearing upon the business
aspects or property of the partnership and prohibit a partner, to-wit, a fudu-
ciary [sic], from taking any personal advantage touching those subjects."4 9
241. Id. at 763.
242. Id. at 760.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 759.
245. Id. at 764.
246. Id. at 761.
247. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
248. The Rees opinion quoted the relevant language twice, in virtually identical form:
The law forbids a trustee, and all other persons occupying a fiduciary or quasi
fiduciary position, from taking any personal advantage touching the thing or subject
as to which such fiduciary position exists; or, as expressed by another: "Wherever
one person is placed in such relation to another, by the act or consent of that other,
or the act of a third person, or of the law, that he becomes interested for him, or
interested with him, in any subject of property or business, he is prohibited from
acquiring rights in that subject antagonistic to the person with whose interest he has
become associated." If such a person acquires an interest in property as to which
such a relation exists, he holds it as a trustee for the benefit of those in whose
interest he was prohibited from purchasing, to the extent of the prohibition.
Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758, 762 (Okla. 1957) (quoting Clements v. Cates, 4 S.W. 776, 777
(Ark. 1887)).
249. Holman, 522 P.2d at 523. Indeed, Rees can be read as the oil and gas counterpart to
Meinhardv. Salmon. Rees played the part of the managing partner assembling a larger parcel
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The Holman court's recourse to Rees to justify the narrowing of good
faith and fair dealing to only economic predation was especially curious given
the existing case law on point in the state of Washington when the Holman
opinion was drafted. The Washington Supreme Court had adopted language
that "[t]here is no stronger fiduciary relation known to the law than that of a
copartnership.""0 It had held that "[t]he relation existing between co-partners
is one requiring the exercise of the utmost good faith,"251 "that 'partners must
observe the utmost good faith towards each other in all their transactions,"' 2
and that "[t]he relation of partners is fiduciary in character and imposes upon
the members the obligation of the utmost good faith."' 3 As to the meaning
of good faith in the partnership context, the Washington Supreme Court had
stated that "[t]he requirement of the utmost good faith forbids that a partner
benefit his private interest by deceiving his copartner by misrepresentations
or concealments of the confidential relation."' These precedents from Wash-
ington case law easily could have replicated the holding in Rees. The cases
could have been taken for the proposition that partners owe each other a duty
not to use partnership assets or information for personal gain. What the cases
could not have done - because the holdings are not so limited by their terms -
and what Rees did not do, was limit the good faith and fair dealing obligation
to only prohibiting the use of partnership assets or information for personal
gain, as the Holman court found. 5 Indeed, in Bank v. Nelson,256 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court had adopted language on the fiduciary duties of part-
ners inter se that casts the duty to refrain from taking advantage as only one
of three obligations, another being the obligation of the utmost good faith:
The relation of partnership is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon the
members of the firm the obligation of the utmost good faith in their deal-
ings with one another with respect to partnership affairs, of acting for the
for development, and Briscoe played the part of the nonparticipating partner who was deemed
to have trusted that even though his leasehold was about to expire, the managing partner would
include him in the successor lease. As such, nothing is inconsistent with the holding and
support for a broad interpretation of fiduciary duties.
250. Kittilsbyv. Vevelstad, 173 P. 744,745 (Wash. 1918) (quoting Salhingerv. Salhinger,
105 P. 236,237 (Wash. 1909)); see also Bankv. Nelson, 92 P.2d711,712 (Wash. 1939) (same).
251. Danich v. Culjak, 66 P.2d 860, 863 (Wash. 1937). The Danich opinion continues:
"Each partner is a trustee for all, and no individual or group may take an unconscionable
advantage of another." Id., quoted in Bank, 92 P.2d at 713.
252. Karle v. Seder, 214 P.2d 684, 687 (Wash. 1950) (quoting Finn v. Young, 89 P. 400,
401 (Wash. 1907)).
253. In re Estate of Wilson, 315 P.2d 287, 292 (Wash. 1957).
254. Kittilsby v. Vevelstad, 173 P. at 746.
255. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
256. 92P.2d711 (Wash. 1939).
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common benefit of all the partners in all transactions relating to the firm
business, and of refraining from taking any advantage of one another by
the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of
any kind.5 7
Thus, the Holman court did not adequately support its narrow reading of
good faith and fairness. It is not surprising that in a partnership, which is,
after all, "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit,"'58 claims of a breach of good faith and fair dealing
typically involve directly economically predatory actions of one party. But
there is simply no reason to believe that in a partnership, in which "[t]he
relation . . . is fiduciary in character and imposes upon the members the
obligation of the utmost good faith,"'"29 the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing is limited to refraining from directly economically predatory actions.
Other authorities existing at the time of Holman suggested that an expulsion
for non-economically predatory "personal" reasons would not be bona fide
and in good faith26 and that a broader sweep was intended by good faith and
fair dealing in this context.26'
Justice Hecht's concurrence in Bohatch also held out the possibility that
bad faith and unfairness may cut more broadly than economically predatory
motivations and that such nonpredatory bad faith might nullify the contractual
right of the remaining partners to expel the targeted partner: "[I]f an expelled
partners [sic] were to allege and prove bad faith going to the essence, a
different case would be presented .. .. ."" Justice Hecht identified the types
of bad faith that might nullify the contractual right to expel as "'bad faith go-
ing to the essence' or an 'evil, malevolent, or predatory purpose. ' 263 Justice
Hecht cited Nosal as a case in which the "appellate court confronted circum-
257. Bank v. Nelson, 92 P.2d 711, 713 (Wash. 1939) (quoting 47 C.J. Partnership § 209
(1929)).
258. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995) (emphasis added).
259. In re Estate of Wilson, 315 P.2d 287, 292 (Wash. 1957).
260. See BATES, supra note 205, § 242, at 241 ("The [expulsion] powermustbe exercised
bonafide .... and not for the benefit of individual partners or on personal grounds.").
261. See LINDLEY ET AL., supra note 205, at 984.
[T]he court will never allow a partner to be expelled if he can show that his copart-
ners, though justified by the wording of the expulsion clause, have, in fact, taken
advantage of itforbase and unworthy purposes oftheir own, and contrary to that truth
and honor which every partner has a right to demand on the part of his copartners.
Id.
262. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *13 (Tex. Jan. 22,
1998) (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576-77
(N.Y. 1977)).
263. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Gelder Med. Group, 363 N.E.2d at 576-77).
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stances which it believed might give rise to liability for a breach of fiduciary
duty in expelling a partner. 124 Yet in the end, Justice Hecht was not forced
to confront the question of what constitutes nonpredatory bad faith, because
he found that Bohatch's good faith, but mistaken, allegations of partner mis-
conduct were insufficient as a matter of law to ground protections.25
Nosal also may be read as suggesting that merely equating good faith and
fairness with a lack of economic predation is too narrow a definition of good
faith and fairness.266 In that case, the expelled partner maintained "that he was
expelled solely because of his persistent requests to inspect the firm's books
and records, which he contend[ed] would have revealed secretive self-dealing
on the part of the executive committee and fraudulent conduct by [the manag-
ing partner]. 267 The appellate court found that the expulsion of Nosal was
procedurally regular.26 Nosal alleged that he was expelled in retaliation for
his efforts to examine partnership books and records. 269 Although the infer-
ence is that an inspection would have allowed him to uncover evidence of
economic mismanagement and worse, raising the specter of predation, that the
claim is not directly one of economic predation. In the face of a procedurally-
correct expulsion,270 the appellate court reversed the trial court's award of
summaryjudgment in favor of the firm and held thatNosal presented a triable
issue in his claim that the retaliatory expulsion violated the partnership's duty
of good faith.27'
Of course, the Texas Supreme Court in Bohatch rejected such a broad-
ened conception of good faith and fairness. Bohatch and a number of distin-
guished academics asserted that good faith and fair dealing required that a
partner be protected from expulsion motivated solely by a desire to retaliate
for the reporting of unethical or illegal conduct.272 The majority rejected the
claim, having cast the question in terms of an obligation to remain partners:
The fiduciary duty that partners owe one another does not encompass a
duty to remain partners or else answer in tort damages. Nonetheless,
Bohatch and several distinguished legal scholars urge this Court to recog-
264. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239,243
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
265. See id. at * 14-* 15 (Hecht, J., concurring).
266. See Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 246.
267. Id. at 243.
268. Id ("[TJhe expulsion was in conformance with the procedural requirements of both
the 1984 and 1987 agreements.").
269. Id.
270. See id
271. See id at 246.
272. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *4-*5 (Tex. Jan.
22, 1998).
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nize that public policy requires a limited duty to remain partners - i.e., a
partnership must retain a whistleblower partner.
273
In his concurrence in Bohatch, Justice Hecht admitted his doubts regarding
both the position of the majority - that retaliatory expulsion could not violate
the charge for good faith and fairness - and the amici position - that such a
retaliatory expulsion should always be held to violate the charge.274 He was
right to harbor such doubts.
Indeed, authority exists for the proposition that good faith and fairness
in the partner expulsion situation are not limited to merely cases of economic
predation. Partnership treatises cite the British case of'Blisset v. Daniel275 as
being on point.276 In Blisset, the partnership agreement allowed for the
expulsion of a partner on the two-thirds vote of the remaining partners.277 The
managing partner wanted to expel a partner who had opposed the appointment
of the managing partner's son as an assistant.278 The managing partner,
operating without the knowledge of the targeted partner and in part by threat-
ening to resign, obtained the requisite signatures on an expulsion notice.279
The court held that process was not required, as none was provided in the
partnership agreement.280 It held that the defendant did not need to show
cause, as none was required under the partnership agreement."' The court did
not find any noncompliance with the partnership agreement provisions. There
was no finding of a directly economically predatory purpose on the part of the
managing partner, and certainly not on the part of the other partners who
acquiesced in the expulsion, and yet the Blisset court found the expulsion
fraudulent and void and ordered reinstatement.282
It may be that the economic predation standard is at once too narrow and
too broad. As we have seen, the first error in Holman was to define the
273. Id. at *4.
274. Id. at * 14 (Hecht, J., concurring).
275. 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853).
276. See BATES, supra note 205, § 242, at 242 ("It was held ... that the literal construction
of the articles would not be enforced, and that the power could not be used for private benefit,
and on such grounds; and its exercise in this case was fraudulent and vbid, and the complainant
was decreed to be reinstated."); LINDLEY ET AL., supra note 205, at 984-85 ("[It appeared that
they desired to get rid of their copartner, not because so to do was in any sense for the benefit
of the firm in a mercantile point of view, but because he objected to the appointment of one of
his copartner's sons as co-manager with his father."). Bates's work is an American treatise, and
Lindley's book is the American edition of the famous British treatise.
277. Blisset v. Daniel, 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853).
278. Id. at 1035-36.
279. Id. at 1036.
280. Id. at 1022.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 1041; see also BATES, supra note 205, § 243, at 242 (discussing Blisset).
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obligation of good faith and fairness too narrowly. Justice Hecht's concur-
rence in Bohatch pointed to another flaw in Holman, in that the Holman
formulation may also be too broad.283
When the Holman court narrowed the obligation of good faith and
fairness to "the personal relationships between partners... which have a
bearing upon the business aspects or property of the partnership" '84 it was
unclear as to what actions with respect to those business aspects would
constitute bad faith. The Holman court spoke in terms of the rule that "a
partner is not permitted to derive any profit or advantage from the partnership
relationship except'with the full knowledge and consent of the partners." '285
In finding that the Holmans did not claim what would amount to a breach of
the duty of good faith, the court found that "[t]here is no evidence the purpose
of the severance was to gain any business or property advantage to the remain-
ing partners." '286 The suggestion was that any purpose to gain any business or
property advantage for the remaining partners would have constituted bad
faith and been unfair. In his concurring opinion in Bohatch, Justice Hecht
took a more nuanced approach to the question of economic predation and
argued that a strict equation between the pursuit of economic self interest and
a lack of good faith and fairness is inappropriate.2 ' He acknowledged the line
of cases, beginning with Holman, which equate bad faith with economic
predation in the partnership expulsion context.288 But he then suggested the
need to differentiate between proper and improper self-interest:
Despite statements in these cases that partners cannot expel one of their
number for personal profit, in each instance the expelling partners believed
that retaining the partner would hurt the firm financially and that the firm -
and thus the partners themselves - stood to benefit from the expulsion. It
is therefore far too simplistic to say.., that partners cannot expel a partner
for personal financial benefit; if expulsion of a partner to protect the firm's
reputation or preserve its relationship with a client benefits the firm finan-
cially, it perforce benefits the members of the firm. If expulsion of a
partner can be in breach of a fiduciary duty, the circumstances must be
more precisely defined.289
283. See Bohatchv. Butler& Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *16 (Tex. Jan. 22,
1998) (Hecht, J., concurring).
284. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See Bohatch, 1999 WL 19482, at *10-*14 (Hecht, J., concurring).
288. Id at * 10-*11 (Hecht, J., concurring) (citing Holman, 522 P.2d at 523-24; Heller v.
Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 348 (Ct. App. 1996)).
289. Id. at * 12 (Hecht, J., concurring).
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How should good faith and fairness be defined in the partnership expul-
sion context? An appropriate formulation starts with the proposition that both
the underlying fiduciary and contractual calls to good faith and fairness apply
to the expulsion of a partner from a law partnership. This is not a departure
from Holman and its progeny.
The second part of the formulation is the proposition that the call to good
faith and fairness is not simply a prohibition on economic predation, but is a
call to utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty. This is the critical rejection
of Holman's too narrow good faith and fair dealing definition.
The third part of the formulation is that the pursuit of self-interest is not
always in bad faith or unfair. A pursuit of individual self-interest by some of
the partners, but not the collective of the partnership, is inconsistent with the
call to good faith and fairness. A pursuit of the collective self-interest of the
partnership, if not otherwise in violation of the justified expectations of the
expelled partner, might be consistent with the call to good faith and fairness.
The fourth part of the formulation is that what constitutes good faith and
fairness depends on the faithfulness of the partners to an agreed common
purpose and the consistency of the partnership's actions with the justified
expectations of the expelled party.29
2. Cause
The second question that might profitably be revisited with the review of
substantive requirements for expulsions from law partnerships is the issue of
how courts should deal with cause where the partnership agreement is silent
on the question of whether cause need be shown as a predicate for the expul-
sion.
It is helpful to narrow what is at issue here. I doubt that anyone disputes
the proposition that courts should enforce affirmative cause requirements in
partnership agreements, and I am willing to concede the proposition that
courts should also enforce clear provisions in partnership agreements allowing
expulsion without a showing of cause, assuming of course that there are no
otherwise applicable contract-based defenses.291 The issue is what the court
290. This is intended to be compatible with the Restatement conception of contrac-
tual good faith and fair dealing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a
(1981).
291. Thus, for example, I would not change the outcome on this point in Heller, in which
the court rejected an argument for imposition of a for-cause requirement: "jjI]his contention
lacks merit, since the partnership agreement not only contains no language requiring expulsions
for cause, but also states the partners' reserved powers include the right to 'expel any Partner
from the partnership without cause ...." Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr..2d at 346.
One treatise suggests that the quid pro quo for enforcing no-cause expulsion provisions
is a heightened good faith analysis: "If the expulsion is made in good faith in pursuance of an
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should do where there is no indication one way or the other in the partnership
agreement. Apparently, this is not a rare situation. Speaking of partnerships
generally, Professor Hillman has stated:
[A]n expulsion clause should set forth in some detail the grounds for
removing a partner. A surprising number of agreements fail, however, to
address this rather basic issue, rest upon a single standard permitting an
expulsion for the "good" of the partnership, or dispense with a cause re-
quirement altogether.292
The law firm expulsion cases are consistent with this observation. In
Holman, the expulsion clause apparently simply provided that "any member
may be expelled from the Firm by a majority vote of the Executive Commit-
tee., 293 Also, the partnership agreement in Lawlis was apparently silent on
cause. 294 Beasley and Ruskin involve expulsions under a partnership agree-
ment that did not even have an expulsion provision, much less a provision on
cause. 29' Although perhaps not a model of precise drafting, the partnership
agreement in Heller did provide that "the Regular Partners reserve the right
to... expel any Partner from the partnership without cause."
296
Professor Hillman correctly sees the issue of cause as a subset of the
good faith and fairness test:
A threshold question involving the meaning of good faith is whether cause
must be shown to support an expulsion .... Rejecting cause as a compo-
nent of good faith, of course, weakens significantly the standards under
which the expulsion of partners may be assessed and greatly facilitates
partner removal for good reasons or for none.297
Professor Hillman's treatise captures the present limited and somewhat equiv-
ocal state of the record: "[T]he sparse authority that exists under the UPA
indicates thatthe absence ofacause standard inthe expulsion clause eliminates
express power, no reason therefor need be assigned; but if cause be not shown, then it must be
very clearly made out that the exercise of the power has been in good faith." SHUMAKER, supra
note 12, § 101, at 175 (citing Blisset v. Daniel, 68 Eng. Rep. 1022, 1035 (V.C. 1853)).
292. Hillman, supra note 12, at 560-61 (citations omitted).
293. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 519 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
294. See Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
295. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL
438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, Nos. 96-3818, 97-
2805, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to
award of profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both
parties), opinion modified on reh'g, Nos. 96-2805, 96-3818, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL
904065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998); Starkman, supra note 153.
296. Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 345 (Ct. App. 1996).
297. HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.4.1, at 5:10-5:11.
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the need to establish cause.""29 Certainly Holman appears consistent with the
rule that a cause requirement is not present if one is not specified in the partner-
ship agreement.299 Lawlis, however, is somewhat less supportive of a flat
rule.3" In Lawlis, the court declined to impose a for-cause requirement be-
cause to do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the parties."° This takes
the analysis back to contractual good faith and fair dealing. Rather than
looking to the four corners of the partnership agreement, the question should
be: Is the imposition of a cause requirement faithful to an agreed upon purpose
and consistent with the justified expectations of the partners at formation?"
The fiduciary duty of good faith and fairness leads us to the same conclu-
sion as the contractual duty of good faith and fairness. If the underlying
standard is utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty, then it is reasonable to
impose a for-cause requirement on expulsions where the circumstances make
such a requirement a tool of achieving fairness, even when the partnership
agreement is silent.
Clearly this type of contextual determination regarding the imposition of
a for-cause requirement in the expulsion context is a more complicated
298. Id. § 5.3.4.1, at 5:11 (citing Robert W. Hillman, Misconduct as aBasisfor Excluding
or Expelling a Partner, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 527, 569-73 (1983)).
299. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 519, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). The Holman
position that no specification of cause translates into no cause requirement finds support
elsewhere. See BATES, supra note 205, § 242, at 241-42 ("The obligation to exercise good faith
towards each other imposes these limitations [that the expulsion power be exercised bonafide,
and for the benefit of the firm, and not for the benefit of individual partners or on personal
grounds], even though the power is granted in general terms to the majority, without requiring
the existence of any specific grounds.").
300. See Lawlisv. Kightlinger& Gray, 562N.E.2d 435, 439-40, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
The partnership agreement in Lawlis was apparently silent on the question of cause. The
opinion quoted only the language in article X that "A two-thirds (2/3) majority of the Senior
Partners, at any time, may expel any partner from the partnership upon such terms and con-
ditions as set by said Senior Partners." Id. at 439-40. The opinion later appears to charac-
terize this as "a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement." Id. at 442. Finally, the
court declines to expand the narrow definition of good faith from Holman, because "[i]f we
were to hold otherwise, we would be engrafting a 'for cause' requirement upon this agreement
when such was not the intent of the parties at the time they entered into their agreement." Id.
at 443.
301. See id. (declining to expand Holman's narrow definition of good faith because "[i]f
we were to hold otherwise, we would be engrafting a 'for cause' requirement upon this agree-
ment when such was not the intent of the parties at the time they entered into their agreement")
Id. Presumably, the Lawlis court would have been willing to engraft a for-cause requirement,
even in the absence of one in the partnership agreement, had that comported with the intent of
the parties at the time they formed the partnership.
302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) ("Good faith per-
formance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party .... ).
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process than that required under the Holman rule. But with the contemporary
practice of law so widely varied in terms of the size, organization, and gestalt
of firms, such a rule is appropriate. We might imagine that a lateral-entrant
rainmaker coming into a five-hundred-lawyer Wall Street firm that has a
history of voluntary and involuntary "lawyer mobility" might have nojustified
expectation that good faith and fairness would include a for-cause requirement
for expulsion when the partnership agreement is silent on that point. On the
other hand, a newly minted partner who came up through the associate ranks
to make partner at a small, historically stable, five-lawyer, county seat law
firm in southwestern Virginia might very well have ajustified expectation that
good faith and fairness would include a for-cause requirement for expulsion,
even in the absence of such a provision in the partnership agreement.
What should be the rule when the partnership agreement is silent or
unclear as to cause? When the partnership agreement is silent on cause,
courts should impose a cause requirement if such a test is either faithful to an
agreed upon purpose and consistent with the justified expectations of the
partners at formation, or if the circumstances make such a requirement a tool
for achieving fairness. Professor Hillman correctly observes that "[t]he
challenge in interpreting expulsion agreements is to develop sensible pre-
sumptions concerning the parties' intent on the question of cause.""3 3 He
suggests that "[a] presumption in favor of requiring cause unless it has been
waived explicitly and a constructional preference that resolves doubts in this
regard in favor of the expelled partner" is more theoretically justifiable.3 I
agree. Professor Hillman states that such a default rule would lead to greater
precision in drafting expulsion provisions. 5 "All that is required of the
partners," he notes in speaking of the general population of partners, "is that
they express their intent with precision."" The requirement of precision is
even more reasonable, and the proposed rule is even more justified, when
dealing with partners who are lawyers..
3. Collective Purpose
There is authority for the proposition that an expulsion of a partner must
be for the collective benefit of the partnership. 7 This obligation has been
303. Hillman, supra note 12, at 570.
304. Id. at 571.
305. Id
306. Id. at 573.
307. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 205, § 242, at 241 ("The [expulsion] power must be
exercised bonafide, and for the benefit of the firm, and not for the benefit of individual partners
or on personal grounds."); SHUMAKER, supra note 12, § 101, at 174 ("Where a power of
expulsion is conferred, it can only be exercised in good faith, with a view to the benefit of the
firm...
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described as an element of the charge to good faith."8 It can also profitably
be conceived of as a component of the classic duty of loyalty. Using such a
collective purpose test, courts could differentiate between cases in which the
expulsion advances the interests of the partnership, such as those cases in
which the expelled partner's actions threaten to incur liability for the firm or
in which the expelled partner is unable to maintain a productive working
relationship with the other members of the firm, and cases in which the
partner is being expelled for personal and not collective reasons.
In the collective purpose group, we might put Heller, the case in which
the expelled partner had engaged in bizarre personal behavior,0 9 inappropriate
professional behavior,310 a failure to achieve projected billable hours," and
had a high percentage of uncollectable billings.312 On the record presented in
the opinion, it seems beyond question that the firm in Heller met a collective
purpose in expelling Heller.
In the personal purpose group, we might put Nosal, the case in which the
partner was expelled because of his repeated attempts to prove self-dealing on
the part of management committee members3 .3 and his threats of litigation to
vindicate his rights.1 ' The Nosal court found that the facts of the case raised
an inference that the firm's justification for Nosal's expulsion was pretext-
ual.315 In this case, it appeared from the opinion that the expulsion was done
to facilitate the malfeasance of a small clique of partners.31 6 As such, the
expulsion would fail any collective purpose test.
But what of Holman, Lawlis, Beasley, and Bohatch? These cases illus-
trate the difficulty of the rule and suggest a range of procedural mechanisms
to allow courts to decide between or balance the interests of the collective and
of the expelled partner. In each of the four cases, the firm could have asserted
a plausible collective purpose for the expulsion.31 7 In several of the cases,
308. See BATES, supra note 205, § 242, at 241 ("The obligation to exercise good faith
towards each other imposes these limitations [that the expulsion power must be exercised bona
fide, and for the benefit of the firm, and not for the benefit of individual partners or on personal
grounds.]")
309. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 340 (Ct. App. 1996).
310. See id. at 340-41.
311. See id. at 340.
312. See id.
313. See Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). The
appellate court cited repeated unsuccessful attempts by Nosal to gain access to firm financial
records over a five-year period. Id.
314. See id. at 244.
315. See id. at246.
316. See id.
317. See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text (discussing Holman, Lawlis, Beasley,
and Bohatch).
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there were factual issues, the resolution of which was critical for a determina-
tion of the business necessity of the expulsion.31 And, in each of the four, the
expelled partner might plausibly have suggested a remedial action to meet the
legitimate collective purpose for the expulsion without requiring the drastic
step of expulsion. 9
InHolman, partnerFrancis Holmanhad engaged in political activities that
displeased Boeing, amajor client of the firm, had a billing dispute with Boeing,
was alleged to have exploited his lawyer-client relation with Boeing, and
misused confidential client information.32 It has never been clear what the
substantive grounds were to expel the other Holman brother, William. He had
not done any legal work for Boeing for many years. 2 The opinion noted that
William had "raised questions with the executive committee regarding the
inadequacy of the legal rates which the firm charged the Boeing Company.""
It also noted evidence that prior to William's admission to the executive
committee "the committee's meetings had been pleasant, friendly, and charac-
terized by a spirit of unselfishness and devotion to the best interests of the
firm," 3 but that "after admission of the Holmans, there appeared to develop
a polarization among the committee, with the Holmans on one side and the
remainder of the committee on the other."324 It would have been reasonable in
Holman to resolve the factual issues of the content ofFrancis's political speech
and his claimed misuse of confidential client information before evaluating the
business justification for the expulsions. As a set of remedial measures short
of expulsion that would have met the firm's legitimate collective purpose for
the expulsion, the Holmans might have suggested that Francis cease doing
work for Boeing and that Francis make it clear that his political speeches were
not made as a member of the firm or a representative of Boeing.
In Lawlis, the expelled partner had an alcoholism problem.3" The court
found that the alcoholism of a partner could reflect badly on the firm, making
the retention of old clients and the attraction of new clients more difficult.
3 26
318. See infra notes 320-26 and accompanying text (discussing Holman and Lawlis and
noting factual issues that were not resolved).
319. See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text (discussing Holman, Lawlis, Beasley,
and Bohatch and noting possible remedies expelled partner could have suggested in each case).
320. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).




325. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
326. See id. at 442.
Any condition which has the potential to adversely affect the good will or favorable
reputation of a law partnership is one which potentially involves the partnership's
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It would have been reasonable in Lawlis to resolve the factual issues of
Lawlis's medical condition before evaluating the business justification for the
expulsion. As a set of remedial measures short of expulsion that would have
met the firm's legitimate collective purpose for the expulsion, Lawlis might
have suggested that his alcoholism be monitored and that his activities be
refocused on work for existing clients who were comfortable with his condi-
tion and the remedial efforts he had undertaken.
In Beasley, the defendants claimed that the expelled partner was "less
productive" and that overall firm profitability could be improved through the
closing of the Palm Beach office, at which Beasley was resident. 27 As a
remedial measure short of expulsion that would have met the firm's legitimate
collective purpose for the expulsion, Beasley might have suggested that the
Palm Beach office be treated as a self-contained profit center within the firm,
making its profitability a matter of concern to its partners and not the partner-
ship as a whole.
In Bohatch, the firm's rationale for the partner's expulsion presumably
would have been that her good faith, but mistaken, allegation of over. billing
by another partner had so irretrievably disrupted the working relationships
within the Washington, D.C. office as to require her expulsion.328 As a
remedial measure short of expulsion that would have met the firm's legitimate
collective purpose for the expulsion, Bohatch might have suggested that she
be assigned to a different client, or that she be relocated from the Washington,
D.C. office.
How should courts decide collective purpose cases? One possible rule
would place the burden on the firm to simply show a collective purpose ad-
vanced by the expulsion. A more rigorous variation of the test would require
the firm to establish that the collective purpose was in fact the dominant
purpose of the expulsion, not simply a post hoc rationale. If the firm could
demonstrate such a collective purpose, the expulsion would not be subject to
attack on the collective purpose test. Presumably, in all four of our difficult
economic survival. Thus, if a partner's propensity toward alcohol has the potential
to damage the firm's good will or reputation for astuteness in the practice of law,
simple prudence dictates the exercise of corrective action.., since the survival of
the partnership itself is potentially at stake.
Id.
327. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646-AJ, 1996 WL 438777,
at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), rev'd inpart on other grounds, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805, 97-
0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 22, 1998) (reversing as to award of
profits, attorney's fees, and costs, but affirming as to all other points raised by both parties),
opinion modified on reh'g, Nos. 96-2805, 96-3818, 97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 904065 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1998).




cases, the expulsion would withstand this analysis. In Holman, the disruption
of client relations would have sufficed. In Lawlis, the potential threat to the
firm from Lawlis's alcoholism, either in terms of increased malpractice expo-
sure or the disruption of client relations, would have satisfied the collective
purpose test. In Beasley, the collective purpose test would have been satisfied
by the attempt to make the firm more profitable by closing the marginal Palm
Beach office, and in Bohatch, the disruption of relations within the firm's
Washington, D.C. office would have been sufficient to satisfy the test.
Another possible rule would take a further step and seek to test the fit of
the expulsion with the collective purpose asserted. Under such a test, the firm
would have the initial burden to demonstrate the collective purpose advanced
by the expulsion. The expelled partner would then be able to attempt to
demonstrate how the collective purpose could have been reasonably advanced
by a measure less injurious to the partner than expulsion. This rule is evoca-
tive of two landmark Massachusetts cases:329 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co.330 and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.331 In Donahue, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that shareholders in close
corporations owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty as partners
in a partnership, "utmost good faith and loyalty," rather than the somewhat
less demanding standard for corporate directors and majority shareholders,
which is "good faith and inherent fairness." '332 In Wilkes, the court faced a
situation in which a shareholder in a closely held corporation was eliminated
from a salaried position with the firm and denied positions as a director and
officer.333 The court applied the Donahue standard of "utmost good faith and
loyalty" in evaluating the ejected members claims.334 However, the Wilkes
court did craft a two-step test to meet concerns:
[T]hat untempered application of the strict good faith standard enunciated
in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result in the imposition
of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close
corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the
corporation in the best interests of all concerned.33
The first step of the Wilkes test places the burden on the firm to demonstrate
a legitimate business purpose for its action:
329. Commentator Bill Callison also makes reference to this line of cases in construing
good faith in the partnership context. Callison, supra note 3, at 149-53.
330. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
331. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
332. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975).
333. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976).
334. See id. (citations omitted).
335. Id. at 663.
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[W]hen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit against the
majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the
majority, we must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling
stockholders in the individual case. It must be asked whether the control-
ling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action.336
The second step in the Wilkes test shifts the burden to the individual
shareholder to demonstrate that the action proposed by the majority is exces-
sively burdensome to meet the legitimate business purpose:' "When an as-
serted business purpose for their action is advanced by the majority... we
think it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legiti-
mate objective could ,have been achieved through an alternative course of
action less harmful to the minority's interest.037 If those in control of the firm
had made the initial showing, and the minority had attempted the second
showing, the court would have had to "weigh the legitimate business purpose,
if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.0
3 1
I acknowledge the force of the argument that the collective purpose prong
of both the obligation of good faith and fairness and the obligation of loyalty
is better tested using the rule adapted from Wilkes than by using a simple
threshold business purpose test.3 39 The opportunity for the targeted partner to
demonstrate a less injurious way to achieve the collective purpose is actually
a way of raising an inference that the asserted purpose is pretextual and thus
336. Id. The court intended to grant the majority a fair degree of latitude in making policy
for the firm:
In asking this question, we acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a
close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing the business
policy of the corporation. It must have a large measure of discretion, for example,
in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or consolidate,
establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or without
cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.
Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. Professor Hillman appears to endorse the movement toward a linkage between
good faith and the election of less drastic alternatives in some cases. See HILLMAN, supra note
39, § 5.3.4.4, at 5:19.
Although the consequences of an expulsion may be severe, there is little authority
in case law for measuring good faith by reference to the harsh consequences or the
availability of less drastic alternatives. Nevertheless, attempts by a firm to soften
the blow of an expulsion may in appropriate cases support a finding that it has acted
in good faith.
Id.
339. The fact that thoughtful and influential commentator Bill Callison advances this
argument requires its careful consideration. See Callison, supra note 3, at 153 ("I think the
Wilkes standard should be incorporated into the analysis used by courts to determine whether
a partner acted in good faith.").
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raises questions as to the good faith and fairness of the other partners. The
argument would be that if the other partners are charged with complete
fairness, the two-step process does not seem unreasonable. Indeed, this was
my initial view in the symposium presentations from which this article
evolved. But I have become convinced by the arguments of those who favor
the more rigorous version of the first formulation: Ifthe firm can demonstrate
that the expulsion was motivated in fact by a collective purpose, then the
expulsion should be beyond challenge on a collective purpose ground. This
now seems to me a reasonable synthesis. It recognizes the theoretical correct-
ness of the collective purpose requirement and puts the firm to the test without
subjecting parties and courts to the protracted and complex litigation required
to determine the least harmful alternative open to the firm. It also avoids the
unfortunate (if incorrect) appearance of a court seeming to force unwilling
parties to be law partners.340
But does this mean that in every law partner expulsion the firm will end
up litigating the justification for the expulsion decision no matter what the
partnership agreement provides? No - the rule could provide for an excep-
tion. The requirement that the expulsion advance a collective purpose of the
partnership is distinct from the requirement that cause be shown. Both are,
however, subsets of the good faith and fairness question. As I would allow
the partnership agreement to permit expulsions without a showing of cause,
so too would I allow the partnership agreement to permit expulsions without
meeting a collective purpose test. But when the partnership agreement does
not clearly and specifically provide for expulsions without meeting the collec-
tive purpose test, the targeted partner should be able to put the firm to the
proof of a collective purpose.
4. Substance: A Recapitulation
In the area of substance, the appropriate rule for law partner expulsions
has three components: good faith and fairness, cause, and collective purpose.
As to good faith and fairness, both the underlying fiduciary and contractual
calls to good faith and fairness apply to the expulsion of a partner from a law
partnership. The call to good faith and fairness is not simply a prohibition on
economic predation; it is a call to utmost good faith, fairness and honesty. The
pursuit of self-interest is not always in bad faith or unfair. Although a pursuit
of individual (but not collective) self-interest would be inconsistent with the
call to good faith and fairness, a pursuit of the collective self-interest of the
340. The appearance is incorrect because the unwilling partners always have the power,
if not always the right, to dissolve the partnership under the UPA or disassociate under RUPA.
See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(1)(b), 6 U.L.A. 771 (1995); RV. UNF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 602(a), 6 U.L.A. 77 (1995).
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partnership, if not otherwise in violation of the justified expectations of the
expelled partner, might be consistent with the call to good faith and fairness."'
What constitutes good faith and fairness depends on the faithfulness of the
partners to an agreed upon common purpose and the consistency of the partner-
ship's actions with the justified expectations of the expelled party.
As to cause, courts should enforce both affirmative cause requirements
in partnership agreements and clear provisions in partnership agreements
allowing expulsion without a showing of cause, assuming, of course, that
there are no otherwise applicable contract-based defenses. When there is no
indication one way or the other of a cause requirement in the partnership
agreement, courts should impose a cause requirement when such a test is
either faithful to an agreed upon purpose and consistent with the justified
expectations of the partners at formation, or when the circumstances make
such a requirement a tool for achieving fairness. As to collective purpose,
courts should require the firm to demonstrate a legitimate collective purpose
that motivated the expulsion.
B. Process
On the process side, we are confronted with two questions. First, in the
absence of specific provisions in the partnership agreement granting process
protections to the targeted partner, is any process required? Second, should
compliance with such process as required either by law or by agreement be
strictly construed?
1. What Process Is Due?
"Given the sensitivity of lawyers to questions of process," observes noted
authority on law firm breakups, Professor Robert W. Hillman, "a further issue
is whether procedural protections, such as notice and a right to hearing, are
required either as part of or supplementary to the good-faith standard as
applied to expulsions."342 Professor Hillman has the initial question right:
Absent any agreement provisions on expulsion process, does the target get any
procedural protections as a matter of law?
Having framed the initial question correctly, Professor Hillman observes
quite correctly that English courts have been more willing to find a require-
ment for procedural protections in the partnership context than American
341. Professor Don Weidner makes arelated point in his discussion of Beasley: The focus
of the analysis belongs "on the reasonable expectations under the partnership agreement," and
not "to the motivation behind the decision" as to which the partner complains. Weidner, supra
note 135, at 892. "The reasonable expectations of the partners should control," Professor
Weidner suggests, "whether a dissolution is in bad faith." Id. at 896.
342. HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.5.1, at 5:20.
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courts. 43 Indeed, there are English cases, cited as authoritative by American
treatises, that stand for the propositions that the targeted partner must be
afforded "an opportunity to explain and be heard"3" and "must have notice
and an opportunity of being heard," '345 although there is also authority that
seems to limit the right to be heard to expulsions for cause. 46 But counter to
these authorities are the American law firm expulsion cases, starting with
Holman, that adopt the rule that there is no common-law or statutory right to
a particular process in the expulsion context - that process is a matter of
grace, not of right, absent an agreement establishing procedural require-
ments.
347
At this point, Professor Hillman sets up Ehrlich as "[s]tanding in marked
contrast to Holman:"
To the extent that Ehrlich may be read as emphasizing the importance of
process in expulsions, Holman represents a more sensible approach than
Ehrlich to notice and hearing issues. Expelling partners do not in practice
act as an adjudicatory body. The decision to expel typically is a response
to a breakdown in the relationship among partners, rather than a decision
to be reached only after a dispassionate review of facts at a hearing on the
subject. For good reason, notice and hearing rights do not form essential
components of the good faith standard applicable to expulsions .... 348
Professor Hillman's arguments that procedural hurdles to law partner expul-
sions are a bad idea are quite reasonable. Partners are not an adjudicatory
body in this case; the remaining partners are, to a greater or lesser degree, self-
interested. It makes sense, as the Holman court observed, that partners ought
to be able to contract for a quick method of separation.34 9 But the question is
not what law partners ought to contract for; the question is what courts should
343. See id.
344. Russell v. Russell, 14 Ch. D. 471 (1880)); Wood v. Woad, 9 L.R.-Ex. 190 (1874),
Blisset v. Daniel, 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853); BATEs, supra note 205, § 241, at 241 (citing
Steuart v. Gladstone, 10 Ch. D. 626 (1875)).
345. SHUMAKER, supra note 12, § 101 at 175 (citing Wood v. Woad, 9 L.R.-Ex. 190
(1880); Blisset v. Daniel 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853)).
346. See LINDLEYETAL., supra note 205, at 985 ("[lit is conceived that a power to expel
for misconduct cannot be safely acted upon until the delinquent partner has had an opportunity
of explaining his conduct.") (citing Blisset v. Daniel, 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853); Cooper
v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth Dist., 143 Eng. Rep. 414 (C.P. 1863)). Lindley's work
is the American edition of the famous British treatise.
347. See Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336,347 (Ct. App. 1996);
Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 245 (ill. App. Ct. 1996); Lawlis v. Kightlinger
& Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 521-23
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.5, at 5:20.
348. HILLMAN, supra note 39, at 5:23.
349. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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do in the absence of agreement. Here, the process required should depend on
the faithfulness of the partners to an agreed-upon common purpose and the
consistency of the partnership's actions with the justified expectations of the
expelled party.
2. Are Applicable Process Requirements to Be Strictly Construed?
The problem is that by collapsing the question of what process is due
under the law with the question of whether that process is to be strictly
construed, Professor Hillman finesses the second question. As we shall see,
the general authority on the second point is not compatible with the Holman
analysis. The Hillman analysis ends with the observation that "[i]f partners
desire procedural protections applicable to expulsions, they should include
appropriate provisions in their partnership agreements.""35 But of course that
is precisely what Ehrlich is all about: Whether the denial of Ehrlich's proce-
dural rights, as setforth in the partnership agreement, rendered the expulsion
ineffective. 51 What Ehrlich does address, and the point at which Ehrlich
importantly diverges from Holman, is the question of whether the process due
should be strictly construed. Here, Ehrlich is unambiguous: "[E]xpulsion
provisions must be applied strictly, and these provisions define the fiduciary
duties owed among the partners.
3 52
Should procedure be strictly construed? There is ample precedent in the
early authorities to strictly construe what process is available. 53 There is
something of a split in the modem law firm expulsion cases on the question
350. HILLMAN, supra note 39, at 5:23.
351. Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court stated:
The expulsion and voting provisions in the Partnership Agreement require that the
issue of the expulsion of a partner be "before the partnership," i.e., before all of the
partners. Thus, in order for an expulsion vote to be "before the partnership," all of
the partners, including any partners whose expulsion is under consideration, must
be notified that the vote is taking place....
Certain of the Defendants concede that all partners had the right to participate
in partnership meetings... and that Ehrlich was intentionally "excluded from two
meetings which addressed his termination from the firm ......
An unambiguous partnership agreement should not be rewritten by the court.
Id.
352. Id.
353. See BATES, supra note 205, at 240-41 ("Like all provisions for forfeitures, [a power
of expulsion] is strictly construed ..... (citation omitted)); LINDLEYET AL., supra note 205, at
984 ("[A]ll clauses conferring such a power [of expulsion] are construed strictly, on account of
the abuse which may be made of them, and of the hardship of expulsion.... ."); SHUMAKER,
supra note 12, § 101, at 175 ("A power of expulsion will be construed with very great strict-
ness.") (citing Blisset v. Daniel, 68 Eng. Rep. 1022 (V.C. 1853)).
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of whether, once agreed to by the partners, process requirements are to be
strictly enforced. Ehrlich stands for the proposition that process provisions
must be strictly enforced. 54 Other decisions are less strict in their enforce-
ment of process requirements. In Holman, for example, the rules of procedure
for the executive committee required that members be given an agenda of
topics to be discussed at each executive committee meeting. 5 The Holmans
were members of the executive committee, yet they were not given agendas
listing their expulsion as a topic to be discussed. 56 Nevertheless, the court
refused to hold that the resulting expulsion was unlawful. 7
3. Process: A Recapitulation
Courts should enforce partnership agreements as to process in the expul-
sion context. Both agreements creating procedural protections and agree-
ments limiting or eliminating procedural protections should be respected by
the courts. When there is no partnership agreement on process, the courts
should impose process based on the faithfulness of the partners to an agreed
common purpose and the consistency of the partnership's actions with the
justified expectations of the expelled party.
Finally, there is a useful reminder in Nosal that compliance with process
is not alone sufficient to satisfy the good faith and fairness obligation: "Re-
gardless of the discretion conferred upon partners under a partnership agree-
ment, this does not abrogate their high duty to exercise good faith and fair
dealing in the execution of such discretion. 358 Process is not, in the end, a
substitute for substantive good faith and fairness.
C. A Proposal for Reform
What should be the law of law partner expulsions? It can be distilled to
seven propositions:
354. See Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 490 ("A partnership agreement may provide for the
expulsion of partners under prescribed conditions, but such provisions are strictly applied.").
355. See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
356. Seeid. at517-19.
357. See id. at 521.
It is true there was no agenda provided to plaintiffs prior to the May 13 meeting as
is suggested or recommended by the supplementary rules. However, both plaintiffs
testified that they believed their possible termination with the firm would be the
subject of the 8 p.m. May 13 meeting; William Holman had been informed that
afternoon that their relationship with the firm was to be a topic of discussion. We
do not find the failure to provide an agenda was a sufficient violation of the partner-
ship agreement to justify holding there was an unlawful expulsion of the plaintiffs.
Id.
358. Winston & Strawn v. Nosai, 664 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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(1) Both the fiduciary and contractual calls to good faith and fairness
apply to the expulsion of a partner from a law partnership.
(2) The call to good faith and fairness is not simply a prohibition on
economic predation; it is a call to utmost good faith, fairness, and hon-
esty.
(3) The pursuit of collective self-interest using proportionate mea-
sures is not in bad faith or unfair if not otherwise in violation of the
justified expectations of the expelled partner.
(4) What constitutes good faith and fairness depends on the faithful-
ness of the partners to an agreed common purpose and the consistency of
the partnership's actions with the justified expectations of the expelled
party.
(5) Cause is a component of good faith and fairness. Courts should
enforce both affirmative cause requirements in partnership agreements
and clear provisions in partnership agreements allowing expulsion with-
out a showing of cause. When the partnership agreement is silent on
cause, courts should impose a cause requirement where such a test is
either faithful to an agreed upon purpose and consistent with thejustified
expectations of the partners at formation, or where the circumstances
make such a requirement a tool of achieving fairness.
(6) Pursuit of a collective purpose is a component of good faith and
fairness. Courts should place the burden on the firm to demonstrate that
a legitimate collective purpose motivated the expulsion.
(7) Process is a component of good faith and fairness. Courts should
enforce both agreements creating procedural protections and agreements
limiting or eliminating procedural protections. When the partnership
agreement is silent on process, courts should impose process based on
the faithfulness of the partners to an agreed upon common purpose and
the consistency of the partnership's actions with the justified expecta-
tions of the expelled party.
These seven propositions of reform have several common themes. The
first one is a reliance on fiduciary duty, specifically the fiduciary duty of good
faith and fairness, and on contractual good faith and fairness. The second
common theme is an emphasis on substance and process based on the context
of individual situations rather than on rigid rules of general application.
Finally, the propositions enforce clear partnership agreements on both sub-
stance and process but resort to individualized substance and process gap-
fillers in the absence of a clear partnership agreement.
By emphasizing the full range of good faith and fairness considerations,
and not simply the narrow concept of economic predation, by requiring that
process be strictly construed, and by making contextual determinations on
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substance and process when the partnership agreement is silent, this reform
agenda is more attentive to the positions of expelled partners than the present
regime.
However, the proposed system allows the law firm to redress that shift,
if that is the desire of the partners. A clear path is provided for law firms that
wish to adopt a guillotine method of partner expulsion that allows expulsions
without cause, without a collective purpose, and without any procedural pro-
tections. Law firms must simply adopt an appropriately drawn partnership
agreement with such provisions. That is not such a large step away from the
present system in which the right to expel exists only when the partnership
agreement so provides. It is essentially the difference between the well-
written agreement of Pillsbury Madison & Sutro in Heller359 and the poorly-
written agreement of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in Beasley360 and
Ruskin. 6' Frankly, it does not seem to be too much to ask of law firms to
have well-crafted partnership agreements if they wish to expel a partner with-
out cause, collective purpose, or procedural protections.
III RUPA and Law Partner Expulsions
We have seen the first significant revision of general partnership law
since World War I. With the promulgation of the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act (RUPA) by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and its adoption by a significant number of states, the momentum
of change in partnership law has grown.362 How does the current of change
in partnership law match the common themes of our proposed reform of the
law of law partner expulsions? Not particularly well, it turns out, on some
central points. Let us discuss the points of misalignment and leave to the
reader the conclusion as to whether the fault is in the proposed expulsion
reforms or the proposed general partnership law reforms. 63
A. Reliance on Fiduciary Duties
The first common theme of the seven reform propositions is a reliance on
fiduciary duty, specifically the fiduciary duty of good faith and fairness, and
on contractual good faith and fairness. RUPA, in contrast, weakens the
fiduciary duties of partners inter se and seeks to eliminate the fiduciary good
359. See supra notes 95-116 and accompanying text (discussing Heller).
360. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text (discussing Beasley).
361. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing Ruskin).
362. For a general discussion of RUPA, see ROBERT W. HiLLMAN, ALLAN W. VE TAL, AND
DONALD J. WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT (1998).
363. Commentator Bill Callison has discussed the law partner expulsion cases and RUPA.
See Callison, supra note 3, at 139-5 1.
1139
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1083 (1998)
faith and fairness in favor of a strictly contractual conception of good faith
and fair dealing inter se."
1. Good Faith and Fairness
RUPA defines fiduciary duties narrowly, including only the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty. 65 It downgrades good faith and fair dealing from its
traditional role as a fiduciary duty to the status of a nonfiduciary "obligation."
Section 404 of RUPA states that "[a] partner shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing." '366
The drafters intended the characterization of good faith and fair dealing
as a nonfiduciary obligation, rather than as a fiduciary duty, to have substan-
tive effect. 67 That is because they viewed good faith and fair dealing as a
contract concept, not a fiduciary concept defined by the status of the partners
as partners.368 Such a formulation is a fundamental departure from existing
concepts under the UPA and the common law 69 and was motivated by a
desire to thwart plaintiffs' recoveries and judicial innovation. 7
Although the drafters of RUPA intended to abandon fiduciary good faith
and fairness, they left open the prospect of an expansive definition of good
faith and fairness by the courts. Unlike the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care, which are defined in the statute, RUPA does not define the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.371 The drafters declined to define the term,
choosing instead to leave the development of a definition to the courts: "The
364. See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at 185-97.
365. See REv. UNIF. PARTNER SHIPAcT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995) ("The only fiduciary
duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)."). It may help in understanding the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing to look to the path by which the provision reached its final form.
See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at 186; Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523,
542-45, 558 n.154 (1993).
366. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995).
367. See id. § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61. Commentator Bill Callison provides a helpful
overview of the debate on this point. See Callison, supra note 3, at 120-21.
368. See REV. UNiF. PARTNER HIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61 (1995).
369. See Vestal, supra note 365, at 548-49; HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note
362, at 188.
370. See Vestal, supra note 365, at 542-44; HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note
362, at 188-89.
371. Compare REv. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b), (c), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995) (defining
duty of loyalty and duty of care) with REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (d), 6 U.L.A. 58
(1995) (using, but not defining, obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
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meaning of 'good faith and fair dealing' is not firmly fixed under present
law.... It was decided to leave the terms undefined in the Act and allow the
courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases." '372
There are some indications, however, of how the terms ought to be
construed. 73 The UCC definitions of good faith, "honesty in fact and, in the
case of a merchant, the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade... were rejected as too narrow or not applicable."374 The
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is intended, in some circumstances,
to include a disclosure component beyond the disclosures required under
section 403(c).375 The obligation of good faith has been seen as incorporating
general loyalty concepts beyond those included in the statute.376
The treatment of good faith and fairness in RUPA is troublesome. But
the combination of a broad reading of contractual good faith and fair dealing
and the unwillingness of the RUPA drafters to include a narrow, statutory
definition of the concept leaves the way open for courts to adopt a reading of
good faith and fairness in the law partner expulsion context that is compatible
with the reform agenda proposed in this article.
2. Loyalty
RUPA also adopts an exclusive and narrow definition of the duty of
loyalty, including only a duty to account, a duty to refrain from adverse
dealings, and a duty to refrain from competition.377 The RUPA formulation
372. REv. UNEF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61 (1995).
373. In part, analysis should be informed by the nature of the relationship, being one of
great interdependence. See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at 188-90;
Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 81, 84 (1995).
374. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHI Acr § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61 (1995).
375. See id. ("In some situations the obligation of good faith includes a disclosure compo-
nent. Depending on the circumstances, a partner may have an affirmative disclosure obligation
that supplements the Section 403 duty to render information."). This nexus between the
obligation to disclose and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing was noted early in the
drafting process. See Memorandum from Lauris G.L. Rall to Gerald V. Niesar, Chairman, Ad
Hoc Subcommittee on RUPA, "Meeting ofNational Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws: Naples, Florida, August 5-6, 1991," (Aug. 19, 1991), in 1 UNIFORMPARTNERSHIP
AcT, DRAFTS, 1992 (1992) ("[S]ome feltthatthe duty ofdisclosure was probably also contained
in the duty of good faith and fair dealing."); see also HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra
note 362, at 189.
376. See R.U.P.A. JANUARY 4, 1989 DRAFT § 20x ("One argument in favor of the new
good faith' provision is that it will include general loyalty obligations in addition to those now
specifically provided in section 20Y."); see also HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note
362, at 189.
377. See REv.UNIF.PARTNERSHIPACT § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995).
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excludes the collective purpose obligation as a component of the duty of
loyalty, except insofar as the noncollective purpose would constitute a diver-
sion of a partnership opportunity, be adversarial, or be in competition with the
partnership.
3. The Elimination of "Bona Fide"
RUPA does make one change in the statutory language relating directly
to the expulsion of partners. The UPA provides that dissolution is caused
"[b]y the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance
with such power conferred." '378 RUPA, in contrast, provides that "[a] partner
is dissociated from a partnership upon.., the partner's expulsion pursuant to
the partnership agreement." '379
The official commentary indicates that the elimination of the "bona fide"
language from the UPA was not intended to change "the basic rule of UPA
Section 3 1(1)(d).""38 The official comment continues, citing Holman for the
proposition that "[a]s under existing law, the obligation of good faith under
Section 404(d) does not require prior notice, specification of cause, or an
opportunity to be heard."3 '
If the narrow, economic-predation reading of good faith by the Holman
court is incorrect, then there will be an issue of substantial importance as to
how the RUPA obligation of good faith and fair dealing should be interpreted.
Courts deciding ihat issue should take at face value the commentary's asser-
tion that the deletion of "bona fide" was not intended to work a change in the
law and should not conclude that the removal of "bona fide" was intended to
ossify the incorrect Holman rule.
B. Individualized Decisions Not Rigid Rules of General Application
The second common theme of the seven reform propositions is an empha-
sis on substance and process based on the context of individual situations,
rather than on rigid rules of general application. Some commentators, in
contrast, argue that RUPA should be structured to maximize the predictability
of outcome, thus necessarily reducing the consideration of individual situa-
tions in favor of reliance on rules of general application.382 This represents a
378. UNIF. PARTNERsHIP ACT § 31(1)(d), 6 U.L.A. 771 (1995).
379. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 601(3), 6 U.L.A.72 (1995).
380. Id. at cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61.
381. Id. (citing Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).
382. Professor Dennis Hynes nicely articulates the argument that RUPA should be oriented
toward predictable outcomes. See J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry
Into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29, 44-46 (1995); J. Dennis Hynes,
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policy choice that is at odds with the policy underlying the reforms proposed
in this article.
C. Enforcement of Partner Agreements
The third common theme of the seven reform propositions is to enforce
clear partner agreements on both substance and process but to resort to
individualized substance and process determinations in the absence of a clear
partner agreement. RUPA is in one sense consistent with this approach,
clearly favoring the enforcement of partner-agreement variations of statutory
provisions. The general rule under RUPA is that provisions of the partnership
agreement control over statutory provisions. 83 The provision that implements
the new policy under RUPA is section 103(a): "Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (b), relations among the partners and between the partners and
the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement. 384 As an excep-
tion to the general rule, partners have restricted the right to modify some
statutory provisions because RUPA specifically and affirmatively limits the
partners' rights."' The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is subject to
such a restriction on partner-agreement amendments: "The partnership
agreement may not... eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
under Section 404(d), but the partnership agreement may prescribe the stan-
dards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the
standards are not manifestly unreasonable." '386 The limits of permitted varia-
tions of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing are unclear.387 It is,
however, a reasonable assumption that, given the support of case law for the
guillotine method of law partner expulsion, any clear partnership-agreement
modifications of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that eliminate
cause, collective purpose, and process would be within the range of modifica-
tions not manifestly unreasonable.
If RUPA is incompatible on this point with the proposed reforms in any
respect, and if it holds a trap for the unwary in this regard, it is in the way
Freedom ofContract, FiduciaryDuties, andPartnerships: The Bargain Principle andthe Law
ofAgency, 54 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 439,463 (1997). I have attempted to set forth the opposing
view. See generally Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to
Professor Hynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (1995).
383. See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at 37.
384. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 25 (1998).
385. See id. § 103(b), 6 U.L.A. 25; HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at
38-49.
386. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. 25 (1998).
387. See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at44-49; Callison, supra note
3, at 141-48.
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RUPA conceptualizes the partnership agreement. RUPA defines the term
"partnership agreement" to mean "the agreement, whether written, oral, or
implied, among the partners concerning the partnership, including amend-
ments to the partnership agreement." '388 The official comments confirm that
the drafters intended the definition to be quite broad and include oral agree-
ments as well as agreements "inferred from the conduct of the parties." '389 The
RUPA definition has been the subject of general criticisms. 90.
In relation to the law partner expulsion issue, the RUPA definition of a
partnership agreement is subject to criticism on the partner-agreed modifica-
tion issue. There is a case to be made for the enforcement of oral, or even
implied, partnership expulsion agreements.39" ' Yet the better policy would
require partner-agreed modifications of the cause requirement, the collective
purpose requirement, and any agreements regarding process to be in writing
and not be a "partner agreement" only within the RUPA inclusion of oral,
implied, or inferred agreements. 92 Note that this cuts both ways: Firms will
benefit because findings of cause and collective purpose in prior cases, and
the grant of process in prior cases, will not be construed to be part of the
partnership agreement binding the partnership on the next case.393 But,
expelled partners will not be without rights because of a denial of such
rights - without the benefit of any writing - in past cases.
388. REv. UNF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 101(7), 6 U.L.A. 20 (1998).
389. Id. at cmt., 6 U.L.A. 20.
The definition of "partnership agreement" is adapted from Section 101(9) of
RULPA. The RUPA definition is intended to include the agreement among the
partners, including amendments, concerning either the affairs of the partnership or
the conduct of its business. It does not include other agreements between some or
all of the partners, such as a lease or loan agreement. The partnership agreement
need not be written; it may be oral or inferred from the conduct of the parties.
Id.
390. See HILLMAN, VESTAL, AND WEIDNER, supra note 362, at 23-26.
391. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 565-66. Professor Hillman is less skeptical about
enforcing such agreements: "While the unwritten expulsion agreement is probably a rarity,
and claims seeking to establish such an understanding should be viewed skeptically, it never-
theless is reasonable to assume that some partners have reached oral agreements on this issue."
Id.
392. Professor Don Weidner, the Reporter for RUPA, appears unconcerned on this point.
He states that "[iun examining the reasonable expectations in a particular firm, the behavior of
the partners is as important as their written agreement." Weidner, supra note 135, at 896. I
acknowledge the benefits of such a inclusive view of the partnership agreement, but, in this
case, I think Professor Hynes's predictability virtue may provide the stronger argument.
393. Although, of course, such past practices may inform the reasonable expectations of




Expulsions lack nothing in subtlety ..
The law of law partner expulsions is unsatisfying in several respects. It
is unsatisfying because it springs in very large measure from a single, badly
articulated and poorly supported case. It is unsatisfying because it establishes
a seemingly unassailable rule, that bad faith and unfair dealing in the law
partner expulsion context is limited to economic predation, that is not logi-
cally well connected with the call to good faith and fairness from which it is
claimed to be derived. It is unsatisfying because it is dismissive of procedural
protections.
It is time to reexamine Holman and its progeny and to replace the eco-
nomic predation test with a more contextual inquiry into whether the sub-
stance and process of the expulsion meet the underlying standard of good faith
and fairness. It is time to adopt rules that when the partnership agreement is
silent or confusing as to cause and collective purpose, courts will impose
cause and collective purpose requirements unless the firm can demonstrate
that such tests are not consistent with good faith and fairness. It is time to
adopt a more flexible approach that will allow courts to adapt process require-
ments to the justified expectations of the expelled partner. It certainly is time
to give law firms incentives to be more precise in their expulsion agreements.
Reforming our treatment of law partner expulsions does not end the
necessary discussion. Beyond expulsion lies the topic of dissolution. This
discussion has focused on the right of a firm to expel a partner. It has not
considered the right to dissolve, except insofar as reference has been made to
Dawson.39 Professors Robert W. Hillman and Donald J. Weidner both have
explored the dissolution option as, in effect, an expulsion by other means.396
Professor Hillman explains that "[t]he 'firing' of a partner unsupported by an
underlying expulsion agreement is not an expulsion but is a dissolution by
express will of the partners initiating the 'removal' of one of their
colleagues." '397 As both Professors Hillman and Weidner observe, there is a
critical distinction between an expulsion under an enabling provision of the
partnership agreement and a de facto expulsion accomplished through a
collusive dissolution caused by the exclusion of one partner and a subsequent
394. Robert W. Hillman, Terminating Law Partners Can Bea Risky Venture: Courts Will
Determine Whether the Firing, When Challenged, Was Done in GoodFaith orfor a "Predatory
Purpose,"NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at D1.
395. See Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996).
396. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 531-36; Weidner, supra note 135, at 885-99.
397. See HILLMAN, supra note 39, § 5.3.2, at 5:7-5:8; Weidner, supra note 135, at 885
n.32.
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reformation of the partnership without the excluded partner. That distinction
has to do with the post-dissolution rights of the excluded partner.39 Simply
put, an excluded (but not expelled) partner in a partnership at will has, absent
an effective agreement to the contrary, a right to an accounting of firm assets,
a right to liquidate the partnership, a right to apply the proceeds to satisfy
partnership liabilities, a right to participate in the winding up of the partner-
ship, a right to a cash distribution of any surplus, and a right to be dealt with
in good faith and fairly. 99 These are, as commentators point out, powerful
rights that the excluded partner is given." In at least one case, Beasley, the
de facto expulsion analysis leads to the conclusion that the firm did not act in
accordance with its obligations and the excluded partner's rights.4" 1 More
discussion is required to explore how the collusive dissolution option fits the
reform model proposed in this article for the expulsion situation.
With the changing nature of legal practice, we can be assured that there
will be an increasing tempo of cases such as Holman, Lawlis, Ehrlich, Daw-
son, Heller, Nosal, Bohatch, and even, one fears, Beasley and Ruskin. The
time to get the law right is now, and the way to begin is by returning to a
concentration on good faith and fairness.
398. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 531-36; Weidner, supra note 135, at 887-99.
399. See Weidner, supra note 135, at 889. Professor Hillman states it in somewhat dif-
ferent terms. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 531-36.
400. See Hillman, supra note 12, at 532-34; Weidner, supra note 135, at 889-99.
401. See Weidner, supra note 135, at 888.
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